Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus Ad Bellum by Martin, Craig
 
267 
BINDING THE DOGS OF WAR:  JAPAN AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING OF JUS AD BELLUM 
CRAIG MARTIN* 
1.        INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 268 
2. THEORY AND ARGUMENT ........................................................... 272 
 2.1.  The Development of Jus ad Bellum ..................................... 272 
 2.2.  The Relationship Between International Law and   
                   Constitutional Law ............................................................... 275 
 2.3.  Constitutional Incorporation of International Law .............. 278 
 2.4.  The Legitimacy of Domestic Implementation of Jus ad      
                   Bellum.................................................................................. 283 
3. THE ORIGINS OF ARTICLE 9 ........................................................ 289 
 3.1.  The Constitutional Drafting Process .................................... 292 
 3.2.  Ratification:  Embrace and Emergence of a Norm ................ 297 
4. ARTICLE 9 AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ...................................... 306 
 4.1.  Article 9 as International Law .............................................. 307 
 4.2.  The Government Interpretation of Article 9......................... 316 
 4.3.  Interpretations of Article 9(1) and Consistency with 
International Law ............................................................... 319 
 
5. Article 9 as a Constraint on Policy ........................................... 327 
 
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Lecturer 
at Osaka University, Graduate School of Law and Politics; Barrister & Solicitor 
called to the bar of Ontario, Canada.  I would like to thank Eric Feldman, William 
Burke-White, and Tom Ginsburg for their helpful guidance throughout the 
process of planning and writing this Paper.  I am also grateful to Eyal Benvenisti, 
Lois Chiang, Karen Knop, Brian Langille, Gideon Parchomovsky, Mark Ramseyer, 
Tago Keiichi, Takiguchi Takeshi, Norimoto Setsuko, Peter Von Staden, and Ruth 
Wedgwood, all of whom helped by either providing input and guidance on the 
issues during the early stages, or provided helpful comments and suggestions on 
earlier drafts.  I am also indebted to Arthur Waldron, Lt. Gen.Yamaguchi Noboru, 
Maj. Gen. Nodomi Mitsuru, and Lt. Col. Sano Shutaro for their invaluable 
assistance in arranging interviews for me in the Self-Defence Force, the Ministry 
of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The research for this Paper was 
partly made possible through teaching and research fellowships from Osaka 
University, Graduate School of Law and Politics, for which I am grateful.  I am of 
course responsible for any errors. 
 Japanese names in this Paper follow the Japanese convention of last names 
first, with the exception of formal citations of English works by authors with 
Japanese names. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
268 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
 5.1.  The Yoshida Doctrine and Entrenchment of Pacifism ......... 328 
 5.2.  Article 9 as Legal Norm ........................................................ 335 
 5.3.  The 1991 Gulf War Crisis and its Aftermath ....................... 342 
 5.4.  The Post 9/11 World ............................................................. 348 
6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................. 355 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Force, to counter opposing force, equips itself with the 
inventions of art and science. Attached to force are certain 
self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth 
mentioning, known as international law and custom, but 
they scarcely weaken it. 
  
                                                         Carl von Clausewitz, On War1 
 
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan famously renounces war 
and the threat or use of force to settle international disputes, 
prohibits the maintenance of armed forces or other war potential, 
and denies all rights of belligerency.  Much has been written about 
this provision over the years, and it has received renewed attention 
due to recent debate over the need to amend the Constitution.  But 
the significance of Article 9 from the perspective of international 
law, and in the context of the relationship between constitutional 
and international law, has not been the subject of much analysis, 
particularly in English. 
This Paper examines the origins of Article 9 and the subsequent 
Japanese experience with this provision in order to assess the 
extent to which Article 9 constituted an incorporation of certain 
principles of international law on the use of armed force, the jus ad 
bellum, and the degree to which the principles so incorporated may 
have operated to effectively constrain Japanese defense and foreign 
policy during the sixty years that the Constitution has existed.  It 
will suggest that the American drafters relied upon the 
renunciation of war provision in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the 
prohibition on the use of force from the newly signed U.N. 
Charter, in designing Article 9(1) of the Constitution.  Moreover, 
 
1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 
eds., 1976) (1832). 
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the source of the provision was understood, and its purpose 
embraced, during the ratification process in the Diet (the 
legislature).  While it was often subsequently used by the 
government as a convenient and even cynical shield behind which 
to pursue a self-interested policy of avoiding Cold War 
involvement, it nonetheless operated at times as both a legal 
constraint and as the source of broader constitutive norms, which 
together shaped and restrained government policy. 
It is argued here that if this account is accurate, that is, if it can 
be shown that Article 9 was designed to implement principles of 
jus ad bellum as a pre-commitment device to prevent the use of 
force, and that those principles successfully operated to later 
constrain government policy with respect to the use of force, then 
the Japanese experience provides evidence that it is feasible to use 
constitutional design for the purposes of incorporating and 
implementing in the domestic legal system the international law 
norms on the use of armed force. 
Why does this matter?  First, this conclusion, and particularly 
the richer explanation as to how Article 9 operated to constrain 
policy, is supportive of the theories on international law 
compliance, such as liberal international law theory and 
international legal process theory, which emphasize the 
importance of domestic implementation and internalization of 
international law norms to explain why states obey international 
law.  In this sense, the experience of Japan with Article 9, and the 
“thick” case study that it provides, is more broadly significant than 
is suggested by the more typical treatment of Article 9, in which it 
is characterized as a somewhat esoteric provision that may reveal 
some insights into Japanese law and politics, but nothing more. 
Second, the conclusion supports the inference that more 
widespread constitutional implementation of the principles of jus 
ad bellum could increase compliance with that regime—a regime 
that is the legal foundation for our modern system of collective 
security.  That is significant, because despite the development of 
that system, as well as the increased interaction between 
international and domestic legal systems, and the spread of 
constitutional democracy and the ideas of democratic 
accountability in public governance, the fact remains that few 
democratic constitutions provide explicitly for the process by 
which governments are to decide to unleash the dogs of war, or the 
extent to which international legal principles should be considered 
in arriving at such decisions.  Moreover, the governments of 
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constitutional democracies continue to make decisions to engage in 
armed conflict for reasons that are illegitimate.  The conclusion that 
it is feasible to constitutionalize principles of jus ad bellum such that 
they will effectively operate to shape state policy provides an 
essential premise for a larger normative argument regarding 
constitutional control of the decision to engage in armed conflict.2 
The objective of this Paper, then, is to establish that premise.  It 
proposes to do so through a case study of the Japanese experience 
and the relationship between Article 9 and jus as bellum.  Why the 
Japanese Constitution?  There are a handful of constitutions that 
contain provisions that specifically place some constraints on the 
government’s ability to use armed force, and a few among them 
that have provisions that reflect the non-aggression norms of the 
20th century jus ad bellum regime.3  The war-renouncing 
Constitution of Japan, however, stands out as having made the 
pacifistic norm central to the constitutional framework, and Article 
9 has arguably been the subject of more political debate, academic 
argument, constitutional litigation, and public discourse, than any 
other such constitutional provision in the world.  More than any 
other, Japan’s provision on the use of force has become associated 
with the nation’s sense of identity.  As such, it is a good candidate 
for this analysis. 
 
2 This Paper is part of a larger project to advance that broader normative 
argument, through an analysis of international and constitutional constraints on 
the use of armed force.  In a nutshell, that argument will propose the use of 
constitutional provisions to govern the process of deciding to use armed force in 
two respects: first, that the decision must be made by both the legislative and 
executive branch, thus requiring legislative debate and approval of executive 
branch decisions; and second, that both branches are required by the constitution 
to engage in a serious assessment of whether the use of force under the 
circumstances would be consistent with the current understanding of the relevant 
principles of jus ad bellum.  Depending on the state of jus ad bellum at the time, this 
could involve an assessment of whether the use of force in the circumstances was 
justified or legitimate, or, on the other hand, whether the use of force was 
required under some duty to protect or to intervene for humanitarian purposes.  It 
will be argued that such domestic implementation would reduce the incidence of 
illegitimate decisions and increase compliance with international law. 
3 See, e.g., CONST. art. 11 (Italy), translation available at http://www.senato.it 
/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf; GG art. 26 (F.R.G.); 
see also CONST. (1948, as amended) art. 5 (S. Korea), translation available at 
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/republic.jsp; A MAGYAR 
KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA art. 6(1) (1949, as amended) (Hung.), translation 
available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/hungary.txt; CONST. (1995) art. 9(2) 
(Azer.), translation available at http://www.azerbaijan.az/_GeneralInfo 
/_Constitution/_constitution_e.html. 
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The account is not without its complications, however, as there 
are aspects of Article 9 that are inconsistent with international law, 
and disagreements over the meaning and significance of these 
inconsistencies have complicated the political and legal effect of 
the provision.  Article 9(2) was cobbled together from a unique 
prohibition on all armed forces, and concepts of belligerency from 
a separate area of the laws of war (jus in bello), in a manner that 
created the inconsistencies and helped make Article 9 the focus of 
so much political conflict.  The Paper will argue that it is crucial, in 
assessing the effective functioning of Article 9, to keep the 
distinction between the prohibition on the use of armed force in 
Article 9(1), and the prohibition on the maintenance of armed 
forces in Article 9(2), in sharp focus.  In addition to these 
complications, for the purposes of demonstrating the extent to 
which Article 9 operated to truly bind the government to the mast 
in the fashion of a true pre-commitment device, it is also necessary 
to disentangle those episodes in which the government merely 
used Article 9 as pretext for fending off external pressure from 
those in which it strained mightily against the bonds to respond to 
the Siren song calling for military action. 
The Paper begins, therefore, with a more detailed discussion of 
some of the theoretical foundations for the argument, including an 
explanation of the current jus ad bellum regime, the relationship 
between domestic and international law and how the relationship 
is important to the reasons for state compliance with international 
law, how constitutional incorporation of international law may 
operate in practice, and some of the theoretical justifications for 
using constitutional law to implement jus ad bellum.  In Section 3, 
the Paper examines the history of Article 9 in terms of the drafting 
and ratification process, particularly focusing on the extent to 
which international law principles were relied upon, and the 
manner in which the ratification process embraced its purpose and 
began the process of making Article 9 into a powerful constitutive 
norm. 
Section 4 provides an analysis of Article 9 from the perspective 
of international law, specifically looking at those aspects of the 
provision that are consistent with and operationalize modern jus ad 
bellum, how the provision is interpreted by the government, and 
whether either perspective is inconsistent with international law to 
a degree that would interfere with the operation of Article 9(1).  
Aside from advancing the overall argument in the Paper, it is 
suggested that this Section may add some new perspectives on the 
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proper interpretation of the provision, since it is rarely analyzed in 
a manner informed by international law theory.  In Section 5, the 
Paper turns to the operation of Article 9, and examines the extent 
to which it may be said to have both operated as a narrow legal 
rule to constrain government policy, and shaped government 
policy more broadly as a powerful constitutive norm. 
2. THEORY AND ARGUMENT 
2.1. The Development of Jus ad Bellum 
To begin, it is necessary to briefly explain the broad contours of 
jus ad bellum, and to briefly trace its development so as to be clear 
on where it stood in 1946 when Article 9 was being drafted, and 
how it has changed since.  The laws of war are separated into two 
quite separate regimes, that of jus ad bellum, the laws that govern 
the entry into armed conflict or when a state can legally go to war, 
and that of jus in bello, now often referred to as the laws of 
international armed conflict (“LOIAC”), which constitute the laws 
that govern how armed forces may legitimately wage war.  These 
two regimes are quite separate and distinct, such that the forces of 
a state that commenced an illegal aggressive war may nonetheless 
conduct themselves legally throughout the war, and conversely, 
the forces of a state that commenced fighting for legitimate reasons 
may engage in acts that are in violation of the LOIAC.  In this 
Paper it is jus ad bellum that is of primary interest, though Article 9 
quite strangely incorporates a principle of jus in bello for the 
purpose of achieving a jus ad bellum objective. 
The international law on the use of armed force has developed 
considerably in the last eighty years.  While the doctrine of “just 
war” had in early history governed the legitimacy of war, and 
purported to constrain monarchs from engaging in war that did 
not meet the criteria for just war, it lost its normative power with 
the rise of modern international law and the secularization of the 
concept soon after the Middle Ages.4  From that time until the end 
of the nineteenth century there was essentially no legal principle 
limiting the use of warfare as a legitimate tool of international 
 
4 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 65 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 4th ed. 2005) (1988). 
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relations.5  It was, indeed, in this context that Clausewitz wrote on 
the “imperceptible limitations” of international law.6 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the first steps in 
placing general legal limits on the use of armed force as a 
legitimate means of dispute resolution.7  But these merely bound 
state parties to resort to the good offices of friendly states prior to 
making “an appeal to arms.”8  The Covenant of the League of 
Nations, adopted in 1919 in the aftermath of the “war to end all 
wars,” advanced the project to reduce the incidence of war further, 
taking the first tentative steps towards the establishment of a 
collective security system.9  But it too only limited the rights of 
members to resort to war, prescribing cooling-off periods and 
arbitration procedures that had to be fulfilled prior to commencing 
war, but did not entirely prohibit even aggression.10  In 1928, 
however, the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Agreement as it 
came to be known (after the U.S. Secretary of State and French 
Foreign Minister), became the first multilateral treaty that 
purported to prohibit recourse to war.  The key provision was in 
Article I, which read: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly 
declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another.”11  Over forty states were party to the Kellogg-
Briand Pact by 1929 when it came into force, and 62 parties 
ultimately signed it.  While it failed to provide for any enforcement 
 
5 Id. at 67. 
6 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 1, at 75. 
7 DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 79; see Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 205 CTS 233 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention I]; Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force 
for the Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 205 CTS 250. 
8 Hague Convention I, supra note 7, art. 2. 
9 League of Nations Covenant art. 10–17 (providing, in part, that “The 
Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League. . .”). 
10 INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR, 62–63 (2000). 
11 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact], 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm. 
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mechanism, it was the first modern international law prohibition 
on the aggressive use of force.12 
Both the League of Nations system and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
were discredited by their failure to prevent the mounting 
incidences of aggressive war, with the Japanese occupation of 
Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) 
being the earliest serious instances, which led to the complete 
breakdown of the system in World War II.  Nonetheless, the 
prosecutions of the former leaders of Nazi Germany and Japan for 
the “crimes against peace” in the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trials were based on the breach of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact.13 
It was with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 that 
the foundation for the current system of jus ad bellum was 
developed.  Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provided that “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  The only exceptions 
provided for were in the exercise of individual and collective self-
defense upon the occurrence of an armed attack (Article 51), or 
such collective use of force by members as has been authorized by 
the Security Council upon a determination that there is a threat to 
the peace and security of the international community (Article 42). 
There has been recent debate about the preventative use of 
force (the so-called Bush Doctrine), and over humanitarian 
intervention.14  Neither of these last two innovations are yet 
 
12 As will be discussed below, the agreement was understood, pursuant to an 
exchange of collateral notes, not to prohibit states from using force in self-defense. 
13 International Military Tribunal for the Far East Indictment, Trial of Japanese 
War Criminals, Publication No. 2613 (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1946); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, U.N. Doc. 
A/1316 1950 (1945). The debate over the legitimacy of those prosecutions, in large 
part, centered on the then-novel imposition of personal criminal liability for a 
state violation of a treaty, but the issue of there having been violations of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact is not seriously questioned. 
14 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) 
available at www.whitehouse.gov./nsc/nss.html (expounding the actual doctrine); 
see generally Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony 
and the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 677 (2004) (describing 
the “Bush Doctrine” as an effort to respond to various security challenges but 
criticizing it as upsetting the existing UN regime and creating other risks to global 
stability); Peter Dombrowski & Rodger A. Payne, The Emerging Consensus for 
Preventative War 48(2) SURVIVOR 115 (2006); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
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accepted as being part of the international law governing the war 
of armed conflict, though they have already been advanced as 
justifications for the actual use of force,15 and they suggest that 
there will be further developments in the jus ad bellum regime that 
will require more sophisticated legal tests to determine the 
legitimacy of the use of armed force.  That in turn requires thinking 
about how and where such tests will be applied, and particularly 
what mechanisms may be developed to ensure that such tests are 
employed prior to any final decision to engage in armed conflict.16  
In that context, the idea that the domestic legal system might be 
employed to assist in the implementation and application of the 
principles of jus ad bellum might be increasingly attractive. 
2.2. The Relationship Between International Law and Constitutional 
Law 
There is a history of ideas regarding limitations on the use of 
force migrating between international law and constitutional law.17  
Early attempts to develop constitutional limits on the executive 
branch’s monopoly control over the use of armed force were 
important influences in the later development of the international 
law prohibition of war.18  Those developments have been traced 
back to the 1688 settlement between the British Parliament and the 
King, which established parliamentary control over the raising and 
funding of armies, through to the U.S. Constitution of 1787, which 
 
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), 
available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/commission-Report.pdf.; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 619 (2005). 
15 Kosovo is the most striking example of an intervention that was justified 
by arguments for humanitarian intervention. While the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was narrowly grounded on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, with 
the notion of “continuing” the first Gulf War, the Bush Doctrine developed from 
the arguments that the United States had the right to use force to prevent a hostile 
nation such as Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction. 
16 See Benvenisti, supra note 14. 
17 The metaphor of the migration of constitutional ideas between different 
constitutional systems, is developed by Sujit Choudhry in Sujit Choudhry, 
Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1–35 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
18 Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Interface of National Constitutional Systems with 
International Law and Institutions on Using Military Forces: Changing Trends in 
Executive and Legislative Powers, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–60 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 
2002). 
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established legislative control over the declaration of war, and the 
French Constitution of 1791.19  It is from these constitutional ideas 
that the later Hague and Kellogg-Briand treaties derived their 
inspiration.20 
In turn, several modern constitutions were influenced by these 
emerging principles of international law on constraining the 
aggressive use of force.  One of the first was that of the Philippines 
in 1935.21  Then, after World War II and the development of the 
modern international laws on the use of force, the constitutions of a 
number of countries, including Italy, Germany, and France under 
the Fourth Republic, in addition to that of Japan, all incorporated 
some form of constitutional limitation on the aggressive use of 
armed force. 22 
Notwithstanding this history of the cross-pollination of ideas, 
the extent of domestic implementation of modern jus ad bellum 
principles or development of domestic legal mechanisms to assist 
in the enforcement of those principles remains very limited.  This is 
somewhat surprising.  As a purely descriptive matter, the last sixty 
years has witnessed the development of an ever-growing 
integration of international and domestic legal systems, with 
domestic law increasingly being employed to implement and 
enforce the provisions of international legal regimes, ranging from 
such technical areas as international trade and intellectual 
 
19 Id. at 42–43; see also 1791 CONST. ch. 3, § 2, ¶ 4 (Fr.) (going so far as to 
provide for criminal prosecution of any minister or agent of executive power for 
any part played in the commencement of hostilities that were subsequently 
determined to constitute aggression). 
20 See also Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace (1795) reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
KANT (Carl J. Friedrich trans., ed., 1949) as one of the philosophical inspirations of 
the Hague and Kellogg-Briand treaties. 
21 CONST. (1935), art. 11, § 3 (Phil.) (“The Philippines renounces war as an 
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of 
international law as part of the law of the Nation.”).  As discussed below, this may 
have been the initial source of MacArthur’s idea for Article 9, as he had been 
military advisor to the Philippine National Militia at the time their Constitution 
was promulgated, as part of the country’s transition to independence. 
22 1949 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.); see also CONST. art. 12 (Costa Rica), unofficial English 
translation available at http://www.costaricalaw.com/legalnet/constitutional_law 
/engtit1.html (providing uniquely with Japan a constitutional prohibition on the 
maintenance of armed forces, while permitting the organization of forces for self-
defense). 
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property, to that of human rights.23  Even international legal 
regimes that relate to areas of so-called “high politics,” such as the 
rules of jus in bello, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation, 
have increasingly found expression in domestic legal systems. 
This increasing interaction and overlap between the two 
systems, and the nature of that relationship, form the basis for 
some of the theoretical explanations for why states comply with 
international law. Whether states actually do “obey” international 
law at all, and if they do, why they should do so in the absence of 
strong international enforcement mechanisms, has been an area of 
intense debate for several hundred years.24  International legal 
process theory, one of the dominant theories among those strands 
that argue that states do comply with international law, explains 
such obedience by reference to the interaction between the 
international and the domestic systems, or the transnational legal 
process.  It argues that such interaction results in the interpretation 
and internalization of international law norms within domestic 
legal systems, which in turn increases compliance with the 
international legal regime in question, due to the operation of the 
domestic law enforcement mechanisms, increased acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the norms, and internalization of the norms into 
the social and political systems.25 
International legal process theory also makes the normative 
claim that increasing such transnational processes is therefore one 
of the best means of increasing compliance with international law.  
It is particularly when international enforcement mechanisms are 
weak but the legal norms in question are clearly defined and 
peremptory, that the best way to increase compliance is through 
vertical strategies of increasing interaction with domestic systems 
to foster internalization of those norms into the domestic structures 
politically, socially, and legally.26 
Similarly, in the liberal theory of international law, another of 
the strands that supports the view that international law has real 
normative power, it is argued that the state actor has to be 
 
23 See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L.  907, 913–914 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2624–25 (1997). 
24 See Koh, supra note 23 (presenting an excellent review of the theoretical 
development and debate among the different theoretical approaches). 
25 Id. at 2634, 2655. 
26 Id. at 2656–57. 
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understood more in terms of its constituent institutions and 
political forces, and that compliance with international law should 
be understood in terms of the manner in which it operates to 
influence these constituent elements of the state. Normatively it is 
argued that the international legal system has to better influence 
and harness such domestic institutions in order to be more 
effective in achieving the objectives of international law.27  Thus, 
international law, in more directly influencing domestic 
institutions, can seek to directly strengthen such domestic 
institutions, back-stop them, or compel them to act in compliance 
with international law.28  All three methods are examples of 
increased reliance on domestic enforcement mechanisms to 
enhance compliance with international law. 
Given the trend of increasing integration of international and 
domestic legal systems one might have expected there to be a 
greater development of domestic mechanisms for the 
implementation of aspects of jus ad bellum.  Moreover, given the 
arguments that such interaction between international and 
domestic legal systems facilitates compliance with international 
law, and if one accepts that the maintenance of peace and security 
is a generally desirable objective and that enhancing compliance 
with the laws underpinning our collective security system would 
help achieve that end, then one would think that there ought to be 
greater domestic implementation of jus ad bellum principles.  If one 
were to consider how that might best be done, then constitutions, 
which usually occupy the position of highest law of the land 
within domestic legal systems, would likely be an area of 
particular interest. 
2.3. Constitutional Incorporation of International Law 
How would the incorporation of international law norms 
actually enhance compliance in practice, and how would such 
norms operate and be internalized as these theories contemplate?  
There are current theories with respect to such questions that both 
provide a useful framework for understanding the Japanese 
experience, and which are in turn supported by the manner in 
 
27 E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of 
International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327 
(2006). 
28 Id. at 333–46.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/4
2008] BINDING THE DOGS OF WAR 279 
 
which the jus ad bellum principles in Article 9 have operated over 
the last sixty years. 
As a descriptive matter, it is well accepted that many of those 
constitutions promulgated or amended in the post-war years have 
incorporated the language and principles of international human 
rights regimes.29  In the area of comparative constitutional law 
theory, there has been work to drill down and examine some of the 
theoretical reasons.  It has been argued that modern constitutions, 
particularly in transitional democracies, have employed 
international law to lock in specific democratic principles and 
norms.30  One of the methods by which constitutions may lock in 
international law commitments is by directly incorporating the 
norms of either customary international law or treaty law into the 
language of the constitution.31  Such studies argue that these 
developments reflect examples of constitutional design being used 
to employ international law as a means of strengthening the pre-
commitment mechanisms of the constitution. 
Constitutions operate as a form of pre-commitment device, in 
that the drafters create constitutional provisions that will bind the 
government’s behavior in the future, motivated by expectations 
that there may be circumstances that, in the absence of such 
constraints, could cause the government of the day to act in a 
manner contrary to reason or the state’s interests.32  It is the 
concept of making arrangements when one is sober in order to 
prevent one from doing harm when drunk.  It is captured in 
Elster’s use of the metaphor of Ulysses, who to protect himself 
from later jumping to his death while in thrall to the Sirens’ song, 
 
29 E.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000). See also Thomas 
Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 211 (1998) (exploring the constitutional developments in those 
countries that have taken an increasingly internationalist attitude toward the 
implementation and observance of international agreements, especially 
international human rights agreements). 
30 Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and 
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 (2006). 
31 Id. at 724. 
32 JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (1979); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of 
Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune 
Slagstad eds., 1988); CASS SUNSTEIN, WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 96-101 (2001). 
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ordered his men to bind him to the mast, stop up their ears with 
beeswax, and refuse any subsequent order to release him.33 
Treaties may similarly operate as pre-commitment devices.  To 
the extent that the motive is to create constraints on the state’s 
future conduct out of concern that it will otherwise behave in a 
manner that is contrary to its welfare (as opposed to being a 
strategy to constrain or otherwise influence other states’ behavior), 
the entry into a treaty constitutes a form of pre-commitment.34  
Indeed, the use of international law as a pre-commitment device 
enjoys the advantage of not being susceptible to change by local 
actors, so that abrogation or violation are the only options available 
to avoid the pre-commitment in the future.  The costs of doing so 
may be perceived by local actors as being high making the pre-
commitment relatively strong. 
The use of constitutions to incorporate the principles of treaties 
already entered into, however, serves to internalize the pre-
commitment, and subject the commitment to domestic 
enforcement mechanisms, thereby increasing the costs and 
difficulty of violating the bonds.35  While Ginsburg focuses on this 
device as a means of strengthening the constitutional pre-
commitment to democratic norms, it can be extended more 
generally, and employed in a normative argument in line with 
“liberal” and “legal process” theories of international law, to use 
domestic constitutional structures to incorporate international law 
rules for the purpose of strengthening the bind of the international 
pre-commitments, thereby enhancing compliance with 
international law.  To put it another way, while Ginsburg and 
others argue that international law is used to strengthen the pre-
commitment mechanisms of the constitution, the corollary that is 
being advanced here is that the pre-commitment devices of the 
 
33 For a more recent discussion of some further nuances of the theory, see Jon 
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2003) (addressing, among 
other things, the difference between collective and individual pre-commitment, 
and the impact of the different permutations that the factors of passion, interest, 
and reason may take as between times T1 and T2). 
34 Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a 
Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2059–60 (2003). 
35 Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 724–25, 730. 
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constitution can be used to enhance compliance with international 
law.36 
The constitutionalizing of international law principles increases 
the probability of compliance because the difficulty and costs of 
non-compliance are thereby raised.  The costs of non-compliance 
will not only be incurred in the international arena by reason of the 
violation of the international obligation, but also domestically as a 
result of the concurrent violation of the constitutional provision 
incorporated the international law norm.  The costs of 
constitutional violation or difficulty of avoiding compliance can be 
that much higher, or at least more immediate, than those 
associated with the corresponding violation of international law, 
particularly when the issue is subject to judicial review and other 
such constitutional enforcement mechanisms.37  To return to 
Elster’s metaphor, Ulysses himself not only had himself bound to 
the mast, but also instructed his crew not to obey any orders to 
release him until they had passed the danger posed by the Sirens. 
Constitutional provisions crafted to incorporate or implement 
principles of international law will also operate on other levels, 
however, at which they may be more effective than that of legal 
rules enforced by the courts.  As mentioned earlier, international 
process theory emphasizes the process of interpretation and 
internalization of international legal norms such that the norms 
begin to operate not only as legal norms, but also as political and 
social norms within the domestic system.38  Constitutional 
 
36 This raises questions as to why governments would choose to do so, and 
what incentives might be required to encourage such innovations, which will be 
dealt with in detail in other parts of the larger project. 
37 The issue of what role the courts might play in the case of 
constitutionalizing jus ad bellum is left for a later segment of the larger project of 
which this Paper is a part.  It is certainly a contentious issue for those who have 
argued in the context of the war powers debate in the United States against any 
judicial role in reviewing the executive decisions to use force, even in violation of 
international law.  See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Executive Power v. 
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 75 (2006) (arguing that the 
President is not, and ought not to be, constrained by international law as a 
constitutional matter in the United States); see also Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, 
Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512 (2006) (suggesting that 
the President needs the power to initiate war and need to seek ex ante 
congressional authorization).  But see JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 53–54 (1993) (arguing 
that it is legitimate for courts to review the process by which decisions are made 
and to ensure compliance with the constitutionally mandated procedure). 
38 Koh, supra note 23, at 2654–55. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
282 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
incorporation is not only the ultimate form of legal 
implementation, but the most powerful means of facilitating social 
and political internalization, for constitutions can, more than any 
other laws, generate and shape the contours of the norms that 
operate on the social and political level, and indeed shape culture 
and the collective identity of nation states.39 
The manner in which constitutional provisions operate as 
norms and shape the norms within the legal, political, and social 
systems of the country is reflected in the Japanese experience with 
Article 9, and understanding how that process works is also 
important to understanding the extent to which Article 9 has 
influenced national policy.  An institutional analysis of the extent 
to which different types of norms have operated to determine 
Japanese national security policy suggests that constitutive norms 
(which are defined as being those norms that are associated with 
national and collective identity, and which shape political conflicts 
over identity) are particularly powerful in Japan.40  Moreover, their 
influence tends to be underestimated by both liberal and realist 
approaches to understanding national security issues.41  This is 
particularly so for Japan because legal norms have long been 
understood to be subsidiary to social norms, playing a crucial role 
in defining and legitimating social norms, but remaining less 
effective as an instrument of coercive control than legal norms in 
other legal systems.  This insight is particularly salient when it 
comes to constitutional norms.42 
 
39 Günter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—
Toward a Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CON. L. 439, 450 (2006). 
40 PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICE 
AND MILITARY IN POSTWAR JAPAN 4–5 (1996). 
41 Id. at 4–5, 112.  For more on constitutive norms, see ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, 
ON LAW AND REASON 276–81 (1989).  For a discussion of constitutional norms as 
legal norms, see Jeremy Waldron, Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1697 (2006).  On norms more generally, see ERIC POSNER, LAW 
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
42 KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 44; see also John O. Haley, Consensual 
Governance: A Study of Law, Culture, and the Political Economy of Postwar Japan, in 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS 32–62 
(Shumpei Kumon & Henry Rosovsky, eds. 1992).  The seminal work on this issue 
is JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX 186 (1991).  Katzenstein defines social norms as a learned and shared 
information pool that exercises influence on behavior, and he sees public opinion 
as both evidence of and the operative mechanism for shaping and giving 
expression to social norms.  KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 38, 116–18. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/4
2008] BINDING THE DOGS OF WAR 283 
 
In particular, the case study that is provided in this Paper 
examines how Article 9 became the source and locus of powerful 
constitutive norms, beginning with the process of constitutional 
ratification that embedded the concept of pacifism in the post-war 
national identity.  Notwithstanding the sometimes bitter conflicts 
over competing narratives regarding Article 9, and the contested 
nature of the constitutive norms that Article 9 generated,43 those 
norms operated to significantly shape public opinion and political 
behavior with respect to issues of national defense.  An overly 
narrow focus on the operation of Article 9 as a legal norm, 
particularly on how it has been interpreted and enforced by the 
judiciary, would miss important aspects of its effects and 
understate its significance. 
2.4. The Legitimacy of Domestic Implementation of Jus ad Bellum 
Before turning to the Japanese experience itself, however, a few 
words should be said on the legitimacy of constitutionalizing 
principles of jus ad bellum.  This is really a more significant aspect 
of the normative argument that will be advanced in the larger 
project of which this Paper is only the first installment, but some 
points can be made here to fend off the most obvious and 
immediate objections to the very notion of creating constitutional 
constraints on the use of force. 
First, there is the objection that international law is developed 
and decided upon by institutions that are not in any way 
representative of the domestic constituency of any given state, and 
the process and procedures of international legal institutions are 
moreover lacking in transparency and accountability.  Given this 
“democratic deficit” in international law, it is not legitimate (so the 
argument goes) to have it imposed on the domestic legal system, 
and states are justified in resisting such domestic implementation.  
But there are powerful arguments that suggest that there are times 
when it is not only legitimate for democracies to permit the 
operation of international law at the domestic level, but that in 
 
43 Mark Chinen’s relatively recent paper on Article 9 deals well with this 
notion of the two competing narratives of how Article 9 was created, and some of 
the ramifications of the competition.  Mark A. Chinen, Article 9 of the Constitution 
of Japan and the Use of Procedural and Substantive Heuristics for Consensus, 27 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 55 (2005).  See also Maki Misaki, Nihon koku kenpō ni monogatari (Narrative) 
wa aru no ka [Is There a Story or ‘Narrative’ in the Japanese Constitution?], 80 Hōritsu 
Jihō 6, 48 (2008) (Japan). 
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some circumstances liberal democratic values actually require that 
democracies implement such international law and develop 
institutions to enforce it.44 
One such argument is for a “constitutionalist model” that 
democracies can use in analyzing the question of when they should 
recognize themselves as bound by international law and obliged to 
implement it domestically.  It consists of a framework of four 
principles, the most important of which is the jurisdictional 
“principle of subsidiarity.”  This is actually a presumption in favor 
of local autonomy (and against the implementation of international 
law) unless any infringements of such autonomy by the enactment 
of pre-emptive rules at the international level can be demonstrably 
justifiable on substantive grounds.45  These substantive grounds 
cannot simply be appeals to the general welfare, but rather, there 
must be some demonstration of what harm or loss would result 
from leaving the policy formulation to national discretion.  
Arguments relating to collective action problems, externalized 
costs, and strategic standards setting, would be the type expected 
to demonstrate the need for international rather than individual 
national legal responses to certain problems, and thus rebutting the 
presumption.46  Moreover, the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which contains a proportionality test, allows 
constitutional democracies to employ well-established domestic 
institutions in making such assessments, and in so doing, 
strengthen the comparative legitimacy of international law.47  
Where democracies do comply with international law in 
accordance with this model, they are acting consistently with and 
manifesting the values that underlie liberal democracy itself.48 
 
44 See Kumm, supra note 23, at 908–09, 915–16 (discussing the duty to obey 
international law). 
45 Id. at 921–25 (arguing that the principle of subsidiarity is central to 
European constitutionalism and is in the process of replacing the concept of 
sovereignty as the core idea that divides the realm of the international from the 
domestic). 
46 Id. at 921–22.  International human rights regimes will not necessarily meet 
this test and Kumm simply exempts fundamental human rights from application, 
without further explanation.  On the other hand, global warming caused by 
carbon emissions would be a classic example of a problem that involves both 
externalized costs of domestic activity and collective action difficulties, which 
would justify an international law response. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 928. 
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The international laws that comprise the modern regime of jus 
ad bellum under the U.N. system satisfy this legitimacy test of the 
constitutionalist model.49  Aggressive use of armed force quite 
obviously creates severe externalized costs, not just for the victim 
of the aggression but for other states in the region that will suffer 
from the effects of armed conflict as well.  Moreover, the threats to 
international peace and security that the collective security system 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter was designed to address 
reflect the quintessential collective action problems that the model 
identifies as justifying higher-order law making. 
Another set of objections that can be anticipated focuses on the 
necessity of leaving the executive branch free from domestic legal 
constraints on its ability to make the appropriate decisions in the 
realm of national security.  According to this view, the government 
may enter into an international convention that commits the state 
to observe certain obligations, but leaves the government free to 
breach those obligations in some future circumstance in which it is 
determined that the costs of breach are less than the benefits of 
doing so.  To import the obligation into the constitution, however, 
would be to vastly complicate that option, and reduce the 
discretion of the government–which of course is the whole point of 
doing so, according to the arguments being advanced in this Paper.  
But for some, such binding of the hands of the executive in 
advance, and possibly invoking the involvement of the judiciary by 
embedding the international law principles into the constitution, 
would be to impermissibly interfere with the executive powers.50 
These arguments are more complicated, and in the United 
States are intertwined with the war powers debate relating to the 
current constitutional distribution of authority on war-making 
decisions.  Some of the arguments advanced within this debate are 
functionalist claims of more general application, arguing that the 
decision to use armed force ought to be governed by cost-benefit 
analyses based on assessments of national interests, and often 
excessively narrow and simplistic concepts of the costs and 
 
49 This argument will be developed further in a separate paper that is part of 
this larger project. 
50 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 37, at 75 (arguing that the President is not, 
and ought not to be, constrained by international law as a constitutional matter in 
the United States); see also Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 37, at 2536–38 (claiming that 
the argument that the President cannot order conduct that is inconsistent with 
international law “runs counter to the best reading of the constitutional text, 
structure, and the history of American practice”). 
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benefits of war.51  These arguments make the claim that not only is 
the executive the best positioned branch to make the 
determinations of what is in the national interest when it comes to 
war, and that involvement of other branches would interfere with 
the process, but that the executive also ought to be free from any 
domestic legal obligation to adhere to international law 
commitments when it is in the national interest to violate those 
commitments.52 
Such functionalist claims have been criticized and dismissed 
elsewhere,53 and there is not room here to engage them in detail.  
But at the most fundamental level it has to be said that the 
overarching argument that the state ought to be left free to violate 
international law whenever it is in the national interest to do so, 
without qualification, suggests an underlying refusal to take 
international law seriously.  This reflects the “realist” view that 
states only comply with international law when it is convenient or 
beneficial to do so, which is obviously at odds with the 
assumptions of this entire project.54  But if one does accept the 
legitimacy of the collective security system and the jus ad bellum 
regime, and one takes seriously the commitments that states have 
 
51 See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 37, at 2518 (discussing past wars in terms of 
wars “won,”  “lost,” and “tied,” as a basis for assessing the relative merits of 
congressional approval of Presidential decisions to use force, which suggests an 
excessively simplistic and narrow understanding of the true strategic, political, 
economic, social, and human costs and benefits of going to war). 
52 See, e.g., id., at 2535 (“[T]he executive branch needs the flexibility to act 
quickly, possibly in situations in which congressional consent cannot be obtained 
in time to act on the intelligence.”); Richard Posner & Cass Sunstein, Debate, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1205–06 (2007) (arguing for 
greater deference with respect to executive decisions related to foreign relations 
law, even decisions in violation of international law). 
53 See, e.g., Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional 
Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1259 (2006) 
(arguing that an expansion of executive power, as advocated by Nzelibe and Yoo, 
will “lead not to better war policy, but to more irrational wars”); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2379 (2006) (“[W]e cannot be 
misled by unfounded claims that the executive constitutes a law unto itself.  Once 
that [happens]. . . the executive itself becomes the most dangerous branch.”); 
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1282 (2007) (arguing that “substantial deference to the executive is 
singularly inappropriate” in foreign relations law). 
54 A more detailed discussion of the different perspectives on the issue of 
compliance with international law, and defending the position that international 
law “matters” and has real normative power, will be provided in a later paper 
that will make the full normative argument for greater constitutional control over 
the decision to use armed force. 
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made to that regime in becoming party to the U.N. Charter and 
other treaties that underlie that regime, it is difficult to see how one 
can argue in a principled fashion that governments should avoid 
any domestic commitment to the regime in order to leave room for 
its violation at the international level.  It is somewhat akin to 
arguing that one should join Alcoholics Anonymous, but ought not 
to tell anyone at home for fear that they might lock up the liquor 
cabinet.  And when one considers the litany of armed conflicts 
engaged in by liberal democracies since the establishment of the 
U.N. system, many in apparent violation of that regime,55 some 
form of an effective domestic mechanism to enhance compliance 
with the regime would seem desirable.56 
The final objection that can be anticipated is that it is not even 
possible to develop effective constitutional constraints on the use 
of armed force, for in moments of crisis such constitutional 
provisions will be simply ignored.  This form of argument can be 
found in a number of variations.  It is reflected in the U.S. war 
powers debate in which it is frequently argued that requiring 
Congressional approval for the use of armed force would not really 
provide for a sober second thought and thereby reduce the 
incidence of imprudent or illegitimate wars, because Congress 
would be just as prone as the executive to patriotic fervor or other 
 
55 The Suez crisis of 1956, the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, the U.S. bombings of 
Cambodia and actions in Laos during the Vietnam war, the U.S. invasion of 
Panama and of Grenada, the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, the second invasion of Iraq in 2003, not to mention 
smaller scale attacks by the United States, such as the recent operations against 
purported terrorists in Somalia in 2007, are just some examples. 
56 There has been recent work suggesting that the international law of armed 
conflict informs the proper interpretation of any congressional approval conferred 
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution for the executive use of armed force, though 
they differ on the extent to which the international laws of war (primarily jus in 
bello) can thereby exercise a real constraint on executive power.  See, e.g., Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2119–20 (2005) (noting that, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004), the Supreme Court plurality looked to, inter alia, the international laws 
of war to determine the extent of congressional authorization for the President to 
use military force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force statutory 
enactment); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: 
International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. R. 
2653, 2662 (2005) (claiming that the international laws of war should assume a 
more central role in the interpretation of the President’s powers under the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force).  But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 37, 
at 75 (“[T]he Constitution does not require the President to obey international 
law.”). 
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passionate emotions in such circumstances.57  An analogous form 
of argument is to be found in much post-9/11 theoretical literature 
on the normative power of constitutional protections more 
generally in times of national crisis and emergency.58 
The point to be made is that the rationales advanced for the use 
of armed force cover a spectrum, from protecting national interests 
as ephemeral as national prestige to desperate efforts to repulse a 
massive invasion of the homeland.  When a state is suddenly 
confronted with an immediate existential threat, one that truly 
threatens the “life of the nation,” then it is unlikely that a 
constitutional provision prohibiting any use of armed force will 
effectively govern state behavior.59  Article 9 would not likely have 
exercised much influence over national policy in the event of a 
Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.  And a carefully tailored 
constitutional provision consistent with international law would 
not purport to prohibit an appropriate response to such existential 
crises in any event.  But few armed conflicts that have involved 
constitutional democracies in the last sixty years have been 
responsive to existential threats, ranging from such low-level 
operations as the U.S. invasion of Grenada at one end to such 
larger conflicts as the Korean conflict, the Vietnam war, the 
Falklands war, or the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001.  
Some were consistent with international law, some were not, but 
with the possible exception of the invasion of Afghanistan in 
response to 9/11, none was a reaction to a national crisis of such a 
scale that constitutional provisions would necessarily be ignored.60  
 
57 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 37, at 8–9 (considering and then criticizing the 
argument that Congress will not “prove wiser on issues of war and peace than the 
president”); Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 37, at 2524 (arguing that Congress will 
likely avoid difficult decisions in foreign affairs and national security by 
delegating to the executive branch). 
58 Kim Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004).  For further discussion of such 
arguments, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1030 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent 
Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699 (2006); Kim Lane Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 
Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 608 (2006). 
59 For a useful discussion of what constitutes a threat to the “life of the 
nation,” see A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, 
[2005] 2 A.C. 68, ¶¶ 88–97 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Hoffman) 
(arguing that a threat of serious physical damage and loss of life does not 
necessarily involve a threat to the life of the nation). 
60 This is not to say that 9/11 did constitute a true existential threat to the 
United States, but it was certainly perceived as a national crisis, and the national 
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This case study suggests that even in moments of considerable 
pressure to use armed force, which reach the levels of perceived 
political crisis, constitutional provisions governing the 
involvement in armed conflict can retain their normative power 
over government policy making. 
In the next Section, the Paper turns to an examination of the 
origins of Article 9, followed by a detailed analysis of how Article 9 
can be understood in terms of international law, and how it 
operated in practice over the last sixty years.  In this sense, the 
Paper explores the history of some aspects of Article 9 in some 
detail, but it does so as a means of using the historical record as 
evidence for the more general theoretical inferences that the Paper 
seeks to draw.61 
3.  THE ORIGINS OF ARTICLE 9 
The story of the making of the constitution is truly remarkable, 
and this short account cannot do it justice.62  While the main focus 
here is on the drafting and ratification process, a few words on the 
context are necessary.  The current Constitution of Japan is 
theoretically a revision of the original Meiji Constitution which 
was promulgated in 1889.  The Meiji Constitution was modeled on 
 
response was one that clearly reflected some readiness to disregard certain 
constitutional provisions and international law commitments. 
61 As a detailed historical analysis of one constitution for the purposes of 
developing general inferences that may tell us something about other 
constitutions, this Paper may be situated within the area of constitutional 
ethnology advocated in Kim Lane Sheppele, Constitutional Ethnology: An 
Introduction, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 389 (2004). 
62 There is a massive literature on the history of the Japanese Constitution, 
most of it in Japanese.  This short account relies primarily on RAY A. MOORE & 
DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE 
STATE UNDER MACARTHUR (2002); KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR 
CONSTITUTION, (1997); OSAMU NISHI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL 
DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN (1987) [hereinafter NISHI, DEFENSE LAW]; OSAMU 
NISHI, TEN DAYS INSIDE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (GHQ): HOW THE ORIGINAL DRAFT 
OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION WAS WRITTEN IN 1946 (1989) [hereinafter, NISHI, TEN 
DAYS]; THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2000); DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION (Robert E. Ward & 
Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds., University of Hawaii Press, 1987); DAN FENNO 
HENDERSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS 1947–67 (1968); 3 
HARA HIDESHIGE, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KEIFU [The Origins of the Japanese 
Constitution] (2004) (Japan), and NIHON-KOKU KENPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI  [The Making 
of the Constitution of Japan] (Takayanagi Kenzō et al. eds., 1972) (Japan).  For an 
account of the process in a broader historical context, see JOHN B. DOWER, 
EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II, chs. 12–13 (1999). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
290 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
the Prussian Constitution, with sovereignty and most nominal 
power in the hands of a transcendent Emperor.  The militarism of 
the 1930’s was largely made possible by the lack of clarity in the 
Meiji Constitution on the exact locus of executive power and the 
operation of supreme command over the military.63  Even before 
the end of World War II, it was understood within the American 
administration that these characteristics of the Meiji Constitution 
and the structure of government that had developed under it had 
been instrumental in the failure of successive cabinets to control 
the military actions that had led to war in East Asia.64 
This understanding was reflected in the final wording of the 
Potsdam Declaration, a joint declaration issued by the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Nationalist Chinese government, on 
July 26, 1945, setting out the terms of surrender that Japan would 
be required to accept in order to cease hostilities.65  Among other 
things, it called for the establishment of the basis for a democratic 
system and a peacefully inclined and responsible government 
established “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the 
Japanese people.”66  In signing the instrument of surrender in 
August 1945, Japan was deemed to have accepted these provisions.  
But there were differing interpretations of what the Potsdam 
Declaration would require by way of constitutional reform.  To 
General MacArthur, Senior Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 
and his senior advisors, it meant that fairly radical constitutional 
amendment would be required.  The Japanese government, 
however, believed that the requirements could be achieved with 
limited constitutional revision, and that the words “in accordance 
 
63 For the history of the making of the Meiji Constitution, see GEORGE M. 
BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE OLIGARCHS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1868–1891 (1957).  On the rise of 
militarism, see YALE CANDEE MAXON, CONTROL OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: A 
STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RIVALRY 1930-1945 (1957) and JAMES B. CROWLEY, JAPAN’S 
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY: NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY 1930–38 (1966).  
For the role of the Emperor, see HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN JAPAN (2000). 
64 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 11–12. 
65 Potsdam Declaration Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, U.S.-P.R.C.-
U.K., July 26, 1945, reprinted in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic 
Documents: 1941-49, at 49-50 (S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office 1950), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution 
/e/etc /c06.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). 
66 Id. para. 12. 
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with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” meant that 
the reform was under its control.67 
MacArthur told representatives of the government in 
September that constitutional reform would be necessary and 
thereafter SCAP68 left the Japanese government to deal with the 
issue until the end of January of 1946.  During that time there was 
considerable drama surrounding the Japanese efforts to grapple 
with reform, which need not concern us here.  The upshot of it was 
that the formal government efforts, undertaken by a committee 
under the chairmanship of Matsumoto Jōji, did not take seriously 
the need for substantial reform of the Meiji Constitution, a fact that 
was dramatically made public on February 1, 1946 with a 
newspaper scoop of one of the committee’s drafts. It was at that 
point that SCAP re-entered the process. 
SCAP had been studying a U.S. policy document, formally 
known as SWNCC 28, on the “Reform of the Japanese 
Government.”  The final version had been sent to MacArthur on 
January 11, 1946.69  It set out a framework for the analysis of what 
amendments would be required to satisfy the Potsdam 
Declaration.  In December the Far East Commission (FEC) had 
been established, and its terms of reference gave it jurisdiction over 
constitutional reform issues.70  SCAP had thus been developing its 
own ideas of what reforms were necessary.  When the conservative 
Matsumoto draft was published MacArthur and others came to the 
conclusion that SCAP would have to become more actively 
involved.  But the Government Section (GS) within SCAP also 
 
67 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 74–75. 
68 SCAP is commonly used to refer to both General MacArthur and the 
occupation administration he commanded. 
69 SWNCC was the acronym for State, War, Navy Coordination Committee.  
SWNCC 28 had been primarily drafted by Hugh Borton, a scholar of Japan, and it 
included a detailed analysis of the government structure and operation under the 
Meiji Constitution, followed by an explanation of reforms that would be necessary 
to redress its shortcomings and to comply with Potsdam.  MOORE & ROBINSON, 
supra note 62, at 84–85. 
70 Formed pursuant to the Moscow Agreement of December 26, 1946, among 
the 11 states that had been engaged in war with Japan.  Agreement Relating to the 
Preparation of Peace Treaties and to Certain Other Problems, U.S.-U.K.-Soviet 
Union, Dec. 27, 1945, 20 U.N.T.S. 259; see also Interim Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers, Moscow (1945), reprinted in A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1941–49, at 58 (S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Greenwood 
Press 1968), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade19.asp 
(describing the meeting leading up to the Moscow Agreement). 
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came to the conclusion that SCAP had only a short window of 
opportunity to seize control of the issue before the FEC would get 
involved.71 
 
3.1. The Constitutional Drafting Process 
MacArthur directed General Whitney, head of GS, to come up 
with a model constitution that SCAP could provide to the Japanese 
cabinet as a basis for its drafting efforts.  MacArthur provided 
Whitney with a one-page memo with the essential elements for the 
model he wanted.  They related to four major points (though SCAP 
set them out as three principles):  (1) the status of the Emperor and 
the locus of sovereignty; (2) the renunciation of war and armed 
forces; (3) the abolition of the feudal system; and (4) the adoption 
of a British style budget system.  The second point, in its entirety, 
read as follows: 
 War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. 
Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its 
disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies 
upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for 
its defense and its protection.   
  No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be 
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be 
conferred upon any Japanese force.72 
Whitney selected a group of twenty-four military and civilian 
members of the GS on February 4, under the direction of Col. 
Kades, and told them that they would form a secret constitutional 
 
71 This was probably incorrect, but it was the governing view in SCAP and 
explains the nature of the subsequent amendment process and the need for 
complete secrecy.  See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 89–90 (describing the 
window of opportunity for SCAP to get involved in the constitutional process 
before the FEC took jurisdiction over the issue), and SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 74–
76 (describing the method of MacArthur’s “suggestions” on the constitution to the 
representatives). 
72 Three Basic Points Stated by Supreme Commander to be “Musts” in 
Constitutional Revision, National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp 
/constitution /e/shiryo/03/072/072_002l.html (last visited September 11, 2008) 
(containing the photographic image of the original memo).  The original 
handwritten note, thought to have been written by Gen. Whitney as dictated to by 
Gen. MacArthur, has been lost.  MCNELLY, supra note 62, at 115–116. 
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convention to develop a new constitution for Japan.  He gave 
Kades the MacArthur note and ordered them to have the draft 
ready by February 11, as a meeting was scheduled with cabinet 
members on February 12.  Using SWNCC 28, draft proposals and 
studies that had been produced by various research groups in 
Japan, and such other constitutions and other texts that could be 
furtively borrowed from various university libraries around 
Tokyo, this young group produced in just six days the draft 
constitution that would, with few significant changes, become the 
new Constitution of Japan. 
The group worked in utter secrecy.  Washington and even 
senior members of SCAP outside of GS were entirely unaware of 
the constitutional drafting effort.  MacArthur and GS were 
working on their own initiative, based on GS’s creative 
interpretation of the FEC’s terms of reference and MacArthur’s 
authority as Supreme Commander.  The drafters relied heavily on 
SWNCC 28 as a guide, but given the secrecy they had no other 
input from other branches of government. 
This fact is important in considering the extent to which the 
drafters were aware of or sufficiently considered recent 
developments in jus ad bellum, because the U.N. Charter had been 
opened for signature the previous summer and had entered into 
force in October of 1945.  The U.S. State Department had been 
deeply involved in the negotiation and drafting of the U.N. 
Charter, and so obviously had a clear understanding of how jus ad 
bellum had been significantly advanced through the Charter, 
particularly with the development of the collective security system 
and the duty of U.N. members to contribute to such collective 
security efforts.  The reference by MacArthur in his memo to Japan 
relying for its defense on “the higher ideals which are now stirring 
the world” was a reference to the fledgling U.N. system, and 
General Whitney is quoted as telling the initial “convention” 
meeting that in their approach to the drafting of the constitution 
“the principles of the [U.N.] Charter should be implicit in our 
thinking.”73  But Kades later stated that he did not have a copy of 
the Charter on hand during the drafting, and with no input from 
Washington at all combined with the time pressure they were 
working under, it is quite likely that Kades and his team had not 
 
73 SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 84–85. 
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fully appreciated the relationship between Articles 2(4) and 
Chapter VII of the Charter.74 
The GS drafting group was divided into committees for the 
purposes of drafting the various sections of the constitution, with a 
steering committee of four members headed by Kades overseeing 
the entire process.  The steering committee itself took on the role of 
turning MacArthur’s renunciation of war and armed forces 
principle into Chapter II of the draft constitution.  It became Article 
8 of the draft and read as follows: 
Article VIII. War as a sovereign right of the nation is 
abolished. 
The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means 
for settling disputes with any other nation. 
No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be 
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be 
conferred upon the State.75 
SWNCC 28, which was the guiding document in the drafting, 
contained no recommendations regarding this renunciation of war.  
There has been intense and voluble debate over where the idea 
first originated, fueled in no small measure by MacArthur later 
attributing the idea to Shidehara.  The better view, it seems, is that 
it was MacArthur’s idea and that he was very likely drawing upon 
 
74 Kades himself has left an account of the drafting process, published in 
1989, in which he says very little about the extent to which he and the drafting 
team considered or had reference to the U.N. Charter.  Charles L. Kades, The 
American Role in Revising Japan’s Constitution, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 215, 237 (Summer 
1989).  Kades himself died in 1990, but in an interview with Osamu Nishi in 1985, 
Kades indicated that he had inserted the words “and the threat or use of force” 
because he thought he had seen them in either the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the 
U.N. Charter, but that he had neither documents on hand during the drafting 
itself.  NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, supra note 62, at 86.  In fact, Moore and Robinson’s 
collection of documents relating to the making of the constitution contained only 
one document from the American drafting session mentioning the U.N. Charter—
a summary report on the meeting of the GS team when it received its orders from 
Whitney on February 4, 1946.  It is noted at the very end that “the principles of the 
Charter should be implicit in our thinking as we draft the Constitution.” THE 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ITS FRAMING AND ADOPTION,  
Document RM143 (Ray A. Moore & Donald L. Robinson eds., Princeton 
University Press CD-ROM, 1998). 
75 Constitution of Japan [Draft], ch. II, art. 8 (1946), available at 
http://www.cc.matsuyama-u.ac.jp/~tamura/makasakennpou.htm (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2008).  It will be noted later that the notion of Japan relying on the 
“higher ideals now stirring the world” for its defense was left for the preamble. 
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the Philippine Constitution of 1935 for part of it.76  But for the 
purposes of this study it is not material who first proposed the 
concept.  What is more important is how it was interpreted and 
understood in the process of its development and ratification. 
In the drafting process itself, Kades has since stated that he was 
guided by the language of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in developing 
the first paragraph of the renunciation of war provision.77  One 
reason why Kades and the steering committee would likely have 
been significantly influenced by the Kellogg-Briand Pact is that 
feverish preparations were then underway for the convening of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials) just a few blocks over, also being administered by 
SCAP.  The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East had been promulgated by SCAP on January 19, 1946, just a 
couple of weeks before the GS constitutional drafting mission got 
started, and it created the authority of the tribunal to prosecute 
persons for “crimes against peace.”78  Crimes against peace were 
defined in part as the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
 
76 MacArthur first made the comment about Shidehara in congressional 
hearings, and later repeated it in his memoirs, thus providing a basis for the later 
assumptions about Shidehara.  See, e.g., ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, KENPŌGAKU [Study of 
the Constitution], vol. 1, at 253 (1992) (Japan) (advancing the notion of Shidehara 
proposing the concept).  McNelly analyzes and rejects the argument that 
Shidehara proposed the concept, suggesting that it may have originated with 
Kades.  MCNELLY, supra note 62, at 106–113, 118–119.  Shōichi argues that it was 
much more likely to have been MacArthur, and he advances the notion that 
MacArthur would likely have been influenced by the Constitution of the 
Philippines, since he had been an advisor to the Philippine National Militia at the 
time the Constitution had been promulgated.  SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 83–86.  
Moreover, Yoshida Shigeru, foreign minister in Shidehara’s cabinet in January 
1946, and later prime minister during the ratification process, dismisses the idea 
that it originated with Shidehara.  YOSHIDA SHIGERU, THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS: THE 
STORY OF JAPAN IN CRISIS 137 (Yoshida Kenichi trans., Greenwood Press 1961).  
Kades repeats a comment made to him by “a high-ranking American official” on 
the subject, “Before the Korean war the author was our old man. After the Korean 
war the author was your old man,” and writes that this may be close to the truth.  
Kades, supra note 74, at 224. 
77 See MCNELLY, supra note 62, at 113, 117 (stating that Kades had the Kellogg-
Briand Pact in mind when drafting the constitution). See also NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, 
supra note 62, at 86 (quoting Kades, who also told Nishi that he had been in law 
school when the Kellogg-Brian Pact had been signed, and it had inspired him at 
the time). 
78 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 
reprinted in A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1941–49 
962 (S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Greenwood Press 1968), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade19.asp. 
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a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, and the 
primary treaty upon which the charges under this provision were 
based was the Kellogg-Briand Pact.79 
Kades also added language to the first paragraph, however, 
that is not present in either the MacArthur memo or the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, renouncing the threat or use of force.  This echoes the 
prohibition on the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the new 
U.N. Charter and suggests that Kades and the steering committee 
had the language of the U.N. Charter in mind.80  Yet, as will be 
examined in more detail below, the rest of the provision is 
inconsistent with other aspects of the Charter, specifically the 
collective security system it contemplates, and as suggested earlier, 
it is possible that the steering committee did not sufficiently 
appreciate the nature of that system as a whole. They also dropped 
the language in MacArthur’s memo that would have explicitly 
renounced the use of force for self-defense.  Kades later claimed 
that he left the issue of self-defense ambiguous, thinking that 
denying the right would have made early revision by the Japanese 
more likely, while including the right explicitly would have 
provoked a backlash in both the United States and within the 
FEC.81 
In sum, the language of the first paragraph was lifted from 
international treaties governing the use of armed force.  On the 
other hand, the second paragraph of the provision, renouncing the 
maintenance of armed forces and denying the rights of 
belligerency, was unique and seemed to make impossible the right 
to self-defense that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was understood to 
have permitted, and which had been made explicit in the new U.N. 
Charter.  This provision was almost certainly not intended to 
implement any principle of international law, but rather to prevent 
Japan from posing a threat in the future and to reassure the FEC in 
 
79 Trial of Japanese War Criminals, supra note 13. 
80 SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 84–85.  But see NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, supra note 62, 
at 86 (noting that Kades did not actually have a copy of the U.N. Charter at hand). 
81 See Chinen, supra note 43, at 95 (citing an interview Kades gave to Iokibe 
Makoto); see also John O. Haley, Waging War: Japan’s Constitutional Constraints 23 
14(2) CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM 18, 23 (2005) [hereinafter Haley, Waging War] (citing 
an interview with Kades in which Kades said he was concerned about reactions 
back in the United States).  Kades, in his own paper, simply wrote that he felt that 
he had omitted MacArthur’s clause because he thought it was unrealistic.  Kades, 
supra note 74, at 236–37.  See also DOWER, supra note 62, at 370. 
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that regard.  Moreover, as will be examined in more detail below, 
the clause denying the rights of belligerency was a rather strange 
use of a concept from the jus in bello regime, apparently to further 
the objective of preventing Japan from ever again engaging in 
armed conflict, an objective associated with jus ad bellum.  But 
while the drafters may have understood that they were denying 
Japan rights under international law, it is unclear what their 
thinking was in creating a provision that was inconsistent with 
emerging responsibilities in the international collective security 
system. 
3.2. Ratification:  Embrace and Emergence of a Norm 
The GS draft constitution was presented to a small delegation 
from the Japanese government, led by then Foreign Minister 
Yoshida and Minister Matsumoto Jōji, on February 12.  It was 
greeted with shock and was seen as being revolutionary.82  In the 
days that followed the Japanese side tried to negotiate a 
compromise between the GS draft and the Matsumoto draft, but 
Whitney was firm that the government had to accept the GS draft 
in “form and principle.”  SCAP threatened to put the draft to the 
people, and more importantly, suggested that only by acceptance 
of the GS draft could MacArthur stave off FEC interference and 
thus ensure the survival of the Imperial Institution. 
It was difficult for the government to accept both the 
renunciation of war and the change of the locus of sovereignty, 
though the latter, which threatened the almost sacrosanct concept 
of kokutai,83 was the more revolutionary innovation and was the 
more fiercely resisted.  When the cabinet met to make a final 
decision on the issue, Ashida Hitoshi, then Minister of Welfare, 
argued in favor of accepting the draft.  On the issue of the 
 
82 YOSHIDA, supra note 76, at 133. 
83 Kokutai, which is usually translated as the “national polity” (it is comprised 
of the characters for country and body), was an abstract concept that was at the 
center of the national ideology forged after the Meiji restoration, with the Emperor 
as the epicenter of a familial nation. Careers such as those of eminent 
constitutional scholar Minobe Takeuchi were destroyed in the 1930s by 
articulating theories perceived as being contrary to the kokutai, and yet as the Diet 
debates on the new constitution revealed, there was no clearly articulated or 
precise understanding of what it meant.  See SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 170–73 
(discussing whether the new constitution altered Japan’s polity), and MOORE & 
ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 196–210 (touching upon the debate of whether 
“kokutai” will survive at all following implementation of the constitution). 
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renunciation of war, he pointed specifically to the similarity 
between the language of the provision and that of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which 
Japan had already committed itself.84 
The provisions on the status of the Emperor were of course 
more problematic, but the argument that the FEC might abolish the 
Imperial Institution entirely won the day.  On February 26, the 
cabinet agreed to accept the draft as the basis for a new 
constitution.  There followed intense sessions of translation, 
revision, and negotiations with SCAP, all under great secrecy and 
great time pressure, as SCAP wanted it published by March 6 to 
forestall FEC interference.  After its publication, the negotiations 
and revisions continued, and a draft in colloquial Japanese was 
published on April 17.85  Throughout these negotiations the 
language of the renunciation of war provision was not changed 
materially, nor was it the subject of any significant disagreement.86 
The plan was to treat this draft constitution as an amendment 
to the Meiji Constitution according to its amendment procedure, 
which required that the amendment had to be first approved by 
the Privy Council, following which it had to be approved by each 
house of the Diet, and then finally approved in final form by the 
Privy Council before it would then be formally promulgated by the 
Emperor.  That was the procedure followed in fact, with the 
deliberations commencing in the Privy Council on April 22 and 
ending on October 7 with a final vote in the House of 
Representatives in favor of the draft with only five abstentions.  In 
both the House of Representatives and the House of Peers, there 
were special committees and smaller sub-committees established 
to assist in the analysis and consideration of the draft. 
 
84 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 114. 
85 The initial draft had been published in traditional formal Japanese used for 
all legal documents, and the publication of the next version in colloquial Japanese 
is considered a momentous event, beginning a revolution in creating greater 
accessibility to the law.  See id. at 155 (discussing the conversion to colloquial 
Japanese), and SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 133 (discussing the importance of the 
new constitution having been published in the vernacular). 
86 To be fair, Matsumoto had suggested in an earlier meeting with Whitney 
that the provision would be better located in the preamble, which Whitney 
rejected out of hand. But Matsumoto had no apparent opposition to the principle 
itself or the substantive language used to express it.  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra 
note 62, at 116. 
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The renunciation of war provision, Article 8 in the GS draft, 
had become Article 9 in the draft that was submitted to the Privy 
Council for approval.  There are two aspects of the long and 
intense process of ratification that unfolded over the course of the 
summer that are significant for our purposes.  The first is that in all 
three bodies, the Privy Council, the House of Representatives, and 
the House of Peers, there were serious questions raised about the 
extent to which Article 9 precluded a right to self-defense, and 
whether the prohibition on the maintenance of armed forces would 
prevent Japan from entering into the U.N. or otherwise interfere 
with its obligations to contribute forces to the U.N. under Article 43 
of the U.N. Charter.  The second, and more surprising aspect, is the 
extent to which there emerged in the process strong expressions of 
support for the ideals articulated in Article 9.  In both 
developments we see the origins of the subsequent debates over 
the proper interpretation of Article 9, an early recognition of the 
internal inconsistencies in the provision, and the birth of the 
powerful but contested constitutive norms that would develop 
around Article 9. 
The questions over the right to self-defense and inconsistency 
with a future obligation to contribute to U.N. collective security 
forces arose from the very outset in the Privy Council and 
continued to be raised throughout the process.  The responses of 
the government interpolators reveal something of their 
understanding at the time, and are also significant if one believes 
in looking to original intent in interpreting a constitution.  On the 
question of self-defense, Yoshida Shigeru, then the prime minister, 
in May said that Article 9 was designed to demonstrate that Japan 
would become a peace-loving nation and that Japan would have to 
rely on the United Nations for its defense.87  Again in July, in the 
sub-committee of the House of Representatives, he stated that 
Japan would be permitted to have forces for the maintenance of 
internal security, but that “‘[i]f we undertake to maintain land, sea, 
and air forces of considerable size under the pretext of police 
power necessary for the maintenance of domestic peace and order, 
 
87 Id. at 212.  See also NISHI, DEFENSE LAWS, supra note 62, at 5, 100–02 (quoting 
Yoshida on the non-right to self-defense); compare with YASUZAWA KIICHIRŌ, KENPŌ 
DAIKYŪJŌ NO KAISHAKU [INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION] (1981) 
(Japan) at 156, 186 (criticizing Yoshida’s comments and dismissing them as 
irrelevant). 
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it will constitute a violation of article 9 of this Constitution.’”88  
Yoshida stated on more than one occasion during the process that 
Article 9 precluded Japan’s ability to maintain any force for the 
purposes of self-defense. 
It is interesting to see the extent to which the members were 
alive to the issue of the apparent inconsistency between Article 9 
and the obligations that Japan would have to contribute to a U.N. 
collective security system if and when it joined, given the apparent 
failure of the American drafters to have considered the issue.  The 
government representatives tried to parry the questions on this 
issue.  During a meeting in May, Irie Toshio, then Director General 
of the Legislation Bureau (“LB”), acknowledged that it appeared 
that, under the terms of the U.N. Charter, member states would 
have to contribute forces,89 but he speculated that Japan might be 
able to receive an exemption from this requirement when it came 
time to join.  When asked if Japan would seek to revise the 
provision, Irie made the telling comment that Article 9 represented 
“burning one’s boats.”90  Kanamori Tokujiro, the key interlocutor 
for the government, similarly acknowledged that there was a 
logical disconnect between Article 9 and the U.N. Charter, but he 
implied that the United States would resolve the problem when the 
issue came to a head. 91  The responses of the government on both 
questions have been seen in retrospect as having been evasive, and 
at times disingenuous, but they can be explained in part by the 
complete secrecy that was still being maintained about the 
American role in the drafting.  That made it difficult for a full and 
frank discussion of intended meaning and motives.  As a result, 
however, the conflicts were never satisfactorily addressed. 
The more surprising aspect of the process, however, was the 
extent to which members embraced the ideals they saw as 
animating Article 9.  At the end of the Privy Council’s 
deliberations, Hayashi Hiroku, an esteemed diplomatic scholar, 
made the statement that with respect to the renunciation of war 
provision, Japan must go forward “on the royal road of justice” 
and suggested that other countries might well regard Japan’s 
 
88 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 215. 
89 U.N. Charter art. 43. 
90 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 170.  This is somewhat ironic and 
prescient, given the use to which this metaphor is put in pre-commitment theory.  
See Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It, supra note 33. 
91 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 214. 
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innovation as a guide for the future, particularly in the context of 
the development of nuclear weapons.92  This characterization of 
Article 9, coupled with the view of its importance in protecting the 
state from again being dragged into war, was to find expression in 
speeches made in both houses of the Diet, and may be seen as the 
beginning of a process by which an important sector of the political 
elite came to embrace the concept of Article 9, and to fashion a new 
vision of Japan as a pacifist state. 
Indeed, the most meaningful amendments to Article 9 were 
proposed and agreed to in order to better reflect the spirit of 
Japan’s embrace of an emerging new pacifism, and to replace the 
impression conveyed by the existing language of the draft, of a 
punitive constraint having been imposed on a defeated nation.  
The amendment, which came to be known as the Ashida 
amendment, was later the subject of considerable controversy, and 
ironically is often explained as having been motivated by a desire 
to create more room for a claim to the right of self-defense.  The 
amendment became significant in later interpretations and 
competing narratives, and so it is necessary to examine it here 
briefly. 
It was developed in the House of Representatives sub-
committee meetings.  The sub-committee was composed of only 
fourteen members and met in-camera.  In telling the story of the 
amendment, it is perhaps best to begin at the end and work 
backwards.  The language of the SCAP draft that was quoted 
above was relatively unchanged by the time it was being discussed 
in sub-committee.93  At the end of the process the Ashida 
amendment had added a clause to the beginning of each 
paragraph, as reflected in the current Article 9, as follows: 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force 
 
92 Id. at 170. 
93 It was unchanged in English—it had undergone some subtle changes in the 
Japanese translation in the various iterations since March 6, and some of those 
changes, it has been argued, were material.  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127 
(2005) (discussing the drafting process and the changing of language during the 
Japanese translation) and see generally KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (1991) (analyzing 
the more complex linguistic and cultural issues of the drafting process). 
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as means of settling international disputes.  
 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not 
be recognized. 
There were other more minor changes, as will be apparent 
from a comparison of this language with that cited earlier, but it 
was the addition of the two clauses that has spawned so much 
controversy.  The reason is that they provide a basis for the 
argument that Article 9 recognizes the right to maintain the 
military capability to defend itself.  It is based on the view that 
paragraph one, in line with the understanding of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, did not prohibit the use of force for the purposes of 
self-defense.  But while paragraph two in the initial draft seemed 
to make self-defense impossible by prohibiting all armed forces, 
the new introductory clause to paragraph two can be interpreted as 
qualifying it, limiting its restrictions to the aims of the first 
paragraph, which is the prohibition of aggression.  Thus, under 
this interpretation, paragraph two only prohibits the maintenance 
of armed forces or other war potential that could be employed in 
the aggressive use of force. 
Ashida himself later made the claim that his motive in 
suggesting the amendment was for just this purpose of providing a 
basis for Japan to claim a right to self-defense in the future.94  The 
problem is that the evidence does not support his claim.95  The 
amendment was actually prompted by a number of complaints, led 
primarily by Suzuki Kantaro of the Social Democratic party, that 
the provision was cast in an overwhelmingly negative and passive 
tone, and that it should be cast in the positive tones of a ringing 
proclamation.  When Ashida first proposed the amendment to 
 
94 SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 194; see also ASHIDA HITOSHI, KENPŌ NO KAISHAKU 
[INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] (1946) (Japan) (discussing the 
constitutional process), and ASHIDA HITOSHI NIKKI [DIARY OF ASHIDA HITOSHI] 
(Shindō Eiichi and Shimokabe Motoharu eds., 1986) (Japan) (describing his 
personal experiences). 
95 See SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 195–202 (analyzing the evidence—only made 
public in 1995—and providing fodder for various conspiracy theories, including 
the fact that the Tōkyo Shinbun had forged an entry of Ashida’s diary, and that the 
government sealed the sub-committee minutes when the issue of the Ashida 
amendment was due to come under scrutiny in the 1957 Commission on the 
Constitution). 
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address this concern, he did so with the explanation that it shifted 
the construction to an active declaration of the Japanese 
renunciation of war, and articulated the pacifist ideals that 
animated it.  There is absolutely no suggestion in the records from 
the sub-committee or his own diary that Ashida ever made any 
suggestion in all the discussions surrounding his proposed 
amendments that it would support a later claim to the right of self-
defense. 96  Moreover, the form in which he originally proposed the 
amendment would not have supported the “self-defense 
capability” interpretation that he later advanced.97  Ironically, 
when the FEC saw the amendment the following month, there was 
concern expressed that it had in fact been adopted for just the 
purpose that Ashida would later proclaim—to give the 
government a basis to establish armed forces for self-defense in the 
future.98 
When the amended draft returned to the full House of 
Representatives for the final debate and adoption, the speeches 
 
96 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 248–49. 
97 Ashida had initially reversed the order of the paragraphs in his proposed 
amendment, placing the renunciation of armed forces and non-recognition of the 
rights of belligerency first, followed by the renunciation of war with the 
introductory clause “in order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph.”  
With such a reversal of paragraphs his original proposal could not be read in the 
same manner as the final amendment, which was qualifying the limitation on 
armed forces to offensive war potential. SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 198–99 and 
NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, supra note 61, at 105. As mentioned above, the sub-committee 
minutes were sealed in 1956, and not made public until 1995, so for four decades 
Ashida’s claims could not be conclusively refuted. But see MCNELLY, supra note 62, 
at 126, and NISHI, TEN DAYS, supra note 62, at 50, 84–85 (suggesting that SCAP 
understood at the time that the Ashida amendment could allow for the 
development of defensive forces and tacitly endorsed that development), and 
Kades, supra note 74, at 237 (noting his recollection that he believed at the time 
that the Ashida amendment might permit Japan to have rudimentary defense 
forces such as “a home guard and a coast guard” and an armed force for 
contribution to U.N. operations). 
98 Transcript of the 27th Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission 18–19 (Sept. 
21, 1946), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/126/126_020l.html.  
The FEC responded by asking SCAP for a provision limiting cabinet positions to 
civilians.  This would become Article 66 of the Constitution.  Ironically, it would 
later provide the basis for arguments that if Article 9 had really meant that no 
military forces could ever be maintained, then Article 66 would not have been 
thought necessary.  Contrary to that argument, it was in fact vehemently resisted 
in the Diet deliberations, both because it undermined the apparent autonomy of 
the process, and because it was clearly recognized from the outset as being 
inconsistent with Article 9. 
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again reflected considerable pride in the amended Article 9.  The 
amendments were explained as being to  
clarify that our determination to renounce war and discard 
armaments is actuated solely by our sincere desire for the 
amicable cooperation of mankind and for world peace. . . .  
[Article 9 would] proclaim to the world [that the Japanese 
were] fervently endeavoring to create a peaceful world 
based on justice and order . . . .99 
In the full house, Ashida himself spoke eloquently of how 
unique the provision was in world history, and how Japan was 
now unique in its commitment to world peace, while Hayashi 
proclaimed that in the nuclear age the peace and survival of the 
world depended on the success of Japan’s historic initiative.100 
This is important in terms of assessing the extent to which 
Article 9 was created in a manner consistent with pre-commitment 
theory, in which motive and the concept of self-binding is key.  If 
Article 9 was merely imposed by external forces without a 
concomitant acceptance by the domestic government, for the 
purpose of constraining future behavior, then it would lack this 
self-binding character.  But the ratification process suggests both 
that Article 9(1) was clearly understood to have incorporated the 
principles of international law, and that the provision as a whole 
was embraced as a means of ensuring that Japan would remain a 
pacifist nation, with institutional constraints to prevent a renegade 
military and weak government from ever again subjecting the 
nation to the horrors of war. 
Moreover, the ratification process was the crucible in which the 
creation of powerful constitutive and social norms got under way.  
Even before the draft was voted on in the House of 
Representatives, polls revealed that seventy percent of the 
Japanese people supported the renunciation of war, and there were 
more speeches embracing the provision in the House of Peers to 
further the process.  These speeches captured the vision that was 
coming to be shared by growing number of Japanese, that their 
country was at the vanguard of nations in creating a new 
constitutional constraint on the making of war.101  Moreover, once 
 
99 MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 62, at 275 (internal citation omitted). 
100 Id. at 280. 
101 Id. at 308. 
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the Constitution was promulgated, the ideals that animated it were 
communicated and explained to the public in an extraordinary 
effort to have them take root in the Japanese body politic.102  The 
vision expressed in the process of ratification, both inspired by and 
used to rationalize Article 9, would in turn develop profound 
normative power in Japan, capturing the imagination of the public.  
As such, Article 9 would emerge from this process not only as a 
legal norm, but as a powerful social and constitutive norm as well. 
 
In concluding this discussion, it is important to note that while 
the drafters drew upon and incorporated principles of 
international law in the design of Article 9, it would be going too 
far to argue that there was any conscious intent to lock-in the 
norms of international law for the purpose of using the Constitution 
to enhance compliance with those international law principles.  
The primary concern was to constrain the perceived threat of the 
potential re-emergence of militarism in Japan, complicated by 
considerations of politics in the United States and managing FEC 
pressure.  The failure to more faithfully model the constitutional 
provision on existing and newly established international law 
rules, and the blending of concepts from two separate regimes in 
international law, are themselves evidence that this was not 
motivated by a desire to ensure compliance with international law 
itself, but rather was the use of international law principles as a 
convenient tool to achieve more practical objectives.103 
 
102 In addition to creating a Committee to Popularize the Constitution, which 
educated middle and lower government officials around the country, the effort 
included the publication and highly organized distribution of twenty million 
booklets to virtually every household in Japan at that time.  The booklets, The New 
Constitution! A Bright Light!, were simply an annotated version of the 
Constitution.  The Ministry of Education also published Story of the New 
Constitution for use in schools.  SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 212–20.  See also DOWER, 
supra note 62, at 402–04 (describing the “massive educational campaign” launched 
regarding Article 9); NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, supra note 62, at 6 (providing an excerpt 
from the Ministry booklets). 
103 Chinen, in his study of Article 9, discusses at some length the theories of 
J.M. Balkin regarding the notion of “bricolage,” the human tendency to use tools 
and concepts that are close at hand and with which the problem-solver is familiar, 
rather than developing specialized tools for the particular problem being 
confronted.  Chinen applies this concept of “bricolage” in considering the 
characteristics of constitutional deliberation in the current Article 9 debates in 
Japan, but the concept would also help explain why Kades and his team would 
have latched on to and cobbled together principles that were familiar to them and 
available in order to achieve the objective they had in mind.  Chinen also points 
out that the use of such jury-rigged solutions will typically give rise to unintended 
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Nonetheless, the constitutional design did involve the 
deliberate incorporation of international law principles on the use 
of force, and how the provision operated thereafter is still 
important from the perspective of determining whether such 
incorporation is feasible and potentially effective.  If there is 
evidence that such incorporation of jus ad bellum principles in a 
national constitution can operate to effectively constrain 
government action and policy, in a manner consistent with the 
international law principles, then it advances the normative 
argument that one could approach constitutional design with a 
view to deliberately implementing such principles in order to 
enhance compliance with international law. 
 
4.  ARTICLE 9 AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Section turns to a more detailed analysis of the extent to 
which Article 9 reflects and is consistent with international law.  In 
order to understand whether Article 9 constitutes a domestic 
implementation of principles of jus ad bellum, and whether its 
effective operation enhances compliance with those principles of 
international law, it is necessary to engage in a deeper analysis of 
the relationship between the provision itself and that international 
legal regime. 
This requires first an examination of what Article 9 means, 
particularly when informed by the principles of international law 
from which parts of it were drawn.  This cannot be a detailed foray 
into the massive interpretation debate that surrounds Article 9, a 
debate that is highly polarized and which has risen to “nearly 
theological levels” in Japan.104  The purpose here is not to advance 
an argument for the “best” interpretation in the context of that 
debate, but some principled analysis and development of a 
baseline interpretation is necessary in order for the following 
discussion to be properly grounded.  In the process, this 
examination may incidentally provide some new perspectives on 
some of the issues germane to the larger debate.105 
 
consequences, as they surely have in the case of Article 9.  Chinen, supra note 43, 
at 71–73. 
104 J. PATRICK BOYD & RICHARD J. SAMUELS, NINE LIVES? THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN JAPAN 5 (E.W. Ctr. Wash., Policy Studies 19, 2005). 
105 There is a general tendency to pay insufficient attention to international 
law perspectives in the debate over Article 9 interpretation.  Hatake, to his credit, 
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The second step, however, once having established some 
baseline understanding of the provision, is to examine the official 
or government interpretation of Article 9.  It is this interpretation 
of Article 9 that informs how and to what extent Article 9 may be 
said to constrain and shape government policy and is thus 
essential to the argument in this Paper. 
 
Third, it is necessary to consider the inconsistencies between 
this official interpretation and the relevant principles of 
international law.  It will become apparent that there are significant 
differences between the interpretation as informed by both 
constitutional and international law principles, and the official 
government interpretation—but the key question is whether those 
differences have significance for the purpose of the argument 
about Article 9 effectively implementing international law 
principles of jus ad bellum.  The final part of this Section takes up 
that question, and suggests that notwithstanding these differences 
and the significant problems in the government interpretation that 
they reveal, and which have long been the source of rabid scholarly 
criticism, there are not any significant inconsistencies between the 
official interpretation of Article 9 and the principles of jus ad bellum 
that Article 9(1) operationalizes. 
4.1. Article 9 as International Law 
Article 9, as it was finally promulgated in the 1947 
Constitution, reads: 
Article 9 – (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes.   
 
devotes a chapter to the issue.  HATAKE MOTOAKI, KENPŌ 9 JŌ: KENKYŪ TO GIRON NO 
SAIZENSEN [ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE VANGUARD ON RESEARCH AND 
ARGUMENTS] ch. 6 (2006).  See also FUJII TOSHIO, KENPŌ TO KOKUSAI SHAKAI [THE 
CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY] chs. 12–14 (2d ed. 2005); Sakamoto 
Masanari, Buryokukōshi ihōka gensoku no naka no kyūjōron [The Article 9 Debate 
Within the Criminalization of the Use of Armed Force] 1334 JURISTO 50, 56 (2007); Nasu 
Hitoshi, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution Revisited in the Light of International 
Law, 18 J. JAPAN L. 50 (2004); and Ando Nisuke, First Session: War and Peace, in 
JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1999).  In general, 
however, the international law considerations tend to be peripheral to most 
analyses of Article 9. 
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(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained.  The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
It is again important to identify the distinction between the two 
sub-sections of the Article, and indeed the three distinct ideas in 
the provision.  Article 9(1) renounces war and the use of armed 
force.  Article 9(2) has two separate ideas—a prohibition on the 
maintenance of armed forces or other ‘war potential’, and the 
denial of rights of belligerency.  As was discussed in the previous 
part, only Article 9(1) was drawn from principles of jus ad bellum, 
and it is with that provision that the analysis of this Paper is 
concerned.  While it is important to consider and examine the 
relationship among the three ideas, it is also necessary to keep 
firmly in focus that, in the project that this Paper is trying to 
advance, Article 9(1) is the key.  Indeed, the controversy that 
perceived violations of Article 9(2) causes tends to obscure the 
important influence of Article 9(1). 
As seen in the earlier discussion, there remains some ambiguity 
regarding the original intent and purpose of Article 9(1), on both 
the part of the drafters and those who ratified the Constitution.  
Kades stated in later years that he thought it unrealistic to leave 
Japan with no right to self-defense, and Ashida has written that he 
intended his amendment to provide Japan with the textual basis 
for just such a move.  The evidence, explored earlier, suggests that 
much of this is revisionist history; the better interpretation is that 
the American drafters intended to leave Japan with no military 
capability, while the government itself, from the prime minister on 
down, stated in the ratification debates that, while Article 9 did not 
necessarily prohibit a right to self-defense, it precluded Japan from 
maintaining the armed forces that would make such defense 
possible.  Nonetheless, the historical record is muddied enough to 
make it difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on the original 
intent and purpose, at least as it relates to the issue of self-defense.  
A further analysis of the concepts themselves, however, provides 
evidence on the issue of purpose and intent. 
Turning to the text and its origins, beginning with Article 9(1), 
this Paper has already described how Kades specifically drew 
upon the language of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in drafting that 
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provision.  The language, however, is not identical.106  Under 
Article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the state parties agreed to 
“condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy 
in their relations with one another.”107  Thus, in several ways 
Article 9(1) went further than the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  It did not 
simply condemn war as an instrument of national policy or as a 
means of settling international disputes,108 but rather was an 
absolute renunciation of war, without qualification, as a sovereign 
right of the nation.  Moreover, Article 9(1) not only renounced 
“war,” the definition and criteria for which had often been debated 
in international law, but it also incorporated language similar to 
that in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, renouncing the “use or 
threat of use of force.”109  The renunciation of the “use of force” 
was qualified by the clause “as a means of settling international 
disputes,” clarifying that it was the use of force in international 
relations that was being constrained.110 
Did Article 9(1) thus drafted, however, thereby import the 
general understanding at the time that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did 
not exclude the use of force in self-defense?  That understanding 
was not derived from the language of the treaty itself, but rather 
from a series of diplomatic notes, initiated by the United States and 
exchanged prior to the conclusion of the treaty, which expressed 
the view that the pact was not intended to deny the right of self-
defense.111  There was nothing in the notes that provided for the 
 
106 Likely due to the fact that Kades and the steering committee did not have 
a copy of the treaty at the time.  NISHI, DEFENSE LAW, supra note 62, at 86. 
107 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 11, art. I. 
108 Strained interpretations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact have suggested that 
wars not waged for the purpose of “national policy,” such as wars for religious or 
ideological ends, might thus be legal.  This was not, however, the accepted view 
or interpretation of the provision.  DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 84. 
109 As such, Article 9(1) is broader in its scope than either the Italian 
Constitution, art. 11, which “repudiates war as an instrument offending the liberty 
of other peoples and as a means for settling international disputes,” or the 
German Basic Law, art. 26(1), which provides that “acts tending to and 
undertaken with the intent of disturbing the peaceful relations between nations, 
especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional.”  Costituzione 
art. 11 (It.);  Gundgesetz art. 26(1) (F.R.G.). 
110 Some argue, unpersuasively in my view, that this clause limited the 
prohibition to “aggressive” wars.  See infra note 113; NONAKA TOSHIHIKO & URABE 
NORIHO, KENPŌ NO KAISHAKU [Interpretation of the Constitution] vol. 1, 127 (1989). 
111 DINSTIEIN, supra note 4, at 83.  The notes are reproduced in 22 AM. J. INT’L 
L. SUP. 109–13 (1928), with replies in 23 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP. 1, 1–13 (1929); see also 
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conditions that had to be met to trigger the right of self-defense, or 
how it was to be limited, in contrast to the later U.N. Charter, 
which set out explicitly the right of individual and collective self-
defense, and the specific conditions for its exercise. 
While there is no question that Article 9(1) was drafted with the 
intent of incorporating the principle of renunciation of war from 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it is difficult to argue that in doing so it 
thereby incorporated by reference the exception to that principle, 
given that the exception was created by diplomatic notes collateral 
to the treaty.  It is an argument that is often asserted but never 
explained in detail.112  The plain language of Article 9(1), which is 
not exactly the same as the Kellogg-Briand Pact even in that part of 
the provision that is modeled on the treaty, and which also goes 
significantly beyond the concepts of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
suggests that it forever renounces the right to engage in war of any 
kind and the use of force for the settlement of international 
disputes of any kind, without any qualification with regard to 
purpose.  The prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter 
from which this language was adopted has a very explicit 
exception for self-defense articulated within the same instrument, 
and Article 9(1) includes no such exception.  The term “as a 
sovereign right of the nation,” not present in the language of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, must also be considered as providing some 
additional meaning to the provision—and indeed the only wars 
remaining as a legitimate sovereign right under the jus ad bellum 
regime of the U.N. system are wars of self-defense and wars 
authorized by the Security Council for the purposes of maintaining 
collective security.  So that would suggest that it is precisely these 
types of war, as sovereign rights, that are renounced. The 
aggressive use of force is no longer a sovereign right of any nation; 
 
DENYS P. MYERS, ORIGIN AND CONCLUSION OF THE PARIS PACT 34–56 (1929) 
(providing a history of the negotiations); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATY FOR THE 
RENUNCIATION OF WAR (1933) (containing reproductions of all the associated 
documents, including the U.S. note of June 23, 1928). 
112 The District Court decision in the Naganuma Case, which will be discussed 
briefly below, has one of the most careful arguments, but it too makes an 
implausible leap from establishing how the Kellogg-Briand Pact excepted self-
defense to asserting that Art. 9 must therefore incorporate the same 
understanding. The interpretation of constitutional provisions modeled on 
international law principles will, of course, be informed by the understanding of 
those principles in international law, but it is also governed by the principles of 
constitutional construction, in which the plain meaning of the text itself is of great 
importance. 
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to interpret Article 9 as renouncing that which did not then exist in 
law is nonsensical. 
As part of the assertion that the exception to the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact had been incorporated into Article 9(1), it is often claimed that 
the clause “to settle international disputes” is the language that 
specifically limits the prohibition to aggressive war.113  The notion 
that somehow armed force used in self-defense is conceptually 
distinct from the “use of force to settle international disputes” is 
also difficult to sustain.  As a matter of constitutional construction 
the clause would more readily suggest a distinction between 
internal and external relations, and as matter of international law 
the clause “use of force for solving international disputes” is not in 
any way synonymous with the concept of aggression.114  Armed 
 
113 NONAKA & URABE, supra note 110, at 127. 
114 The argument that the clause “as a means of settling international 
disputes” was traditionally understood in international law to refer to “aggressive 
war,” is common in Japanese scholarship.  I have not come across the primary 
authority relied upon for this claim, but it seems to stem, in part, from the 
following argument: since the clause was drawn from the language in the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy,” and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was understood to exclude war for the purpose of self-
defense, then the clause must have taken that meaning, and the similar language 
in Article 9 must have been likewise invested with that meaning.  See, e.g., 
HATAKE, supra note 105, at 68 (providing an example of this argument); NONAKA & 
URABE, supra note 110, at 127 (same).  This argument, however, both 
mischaracterizes the international law and makes the fallacious assumption that 
language borrowed from an international treaty (even when the language is 
congruent, unlike this case) must have precisely the same meaning in the 
constitutional context into which it has migrated.  The treaveaux preparatoire for the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact demonstrates that the French initially proposed an explicit 
exception for “legitimate defense” in addition to the language of the clause in 
question.  Other countries had also raised concerns about self-defense.  The 
United States demurred, explaining that to provide for an explicit exception 
would again raise problems of definition.  In circulating the proposed draft that 
ultimately became the treaty, the United States provided a long note of 
explanation in which it was stated that the United States did not mean for 
anything in its draft to restrict the right of self-defense, a right that “is inherent in 
every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty.”  Thus, it was not the 
language of the clause in question that was interpreted so as to limit the 
prohibition to wars of aggression, but rather a communication of an 
understanding separate from the words as written.  This became the 
understanding under which the treaty was entered into, but it did not thereby 
become the “meaning” associated with the language of the provision; 
incorporating the concept of the provision in somewhat different language, in a 
time when there was an explicit right in international law with specific conditions 
for its exercise, does not somehow import the understanding communicated in 
the separate U.S. note.  See MYERS, supra note 111, at 34–56 (providing the 
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conflicts are not only caused by, but also themselves constitute, 
international disputes, and armed force employed in self-defense is 
not any less aimed at resolving the dispute than the force used by 
the aggressor.115  The argument that is often made in Japanese 
scholarship is that this clause is actually drawn from the language 
of “as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one 
another” in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and that that clause was 
understood to be the basis for limiting the Kellogg-Briand Pact to 
aggressive war.116  However, that is a mischaracterization of the 
basis for the exception for self-defense in the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact,117 as explained above, and cannot form the portal through 
which to import the self-defense exception into Article 9(1).118  
Article 9(1) does not on its face, therefore, suggest any room for the 
use of force for any purpose, be it aggression, self-defense 
(individual or collective), or in collective security operations to 
restore international peace and security. 
Turning to Article 9(2), this Paper has already explained that it 
contains two distinct ideas, and that the first, the non-maintenance 
of armed forces or “other war potential,” has no connection to 
international law.  There is much less evidence regarding the 
source and origin of Article 9(2), but on the basis of the MacArthur 
memo alone it appears that MacArthur had in mind a device solely 
designed to prevent Japan from re-emerging as a military threat to 
the United States and its allies once the occupation ended.  The 
Japanese military had been disbanded early in the occupation, and 
the non-maintenance of armed forces clause appears to have been 
aimed at ensuring that it would not be replaced or restored and 
that Japan could never again engage in armed conflict.119 
 
historical background of this process); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 
111 (collecting primary sources from this period). 
115 The use of force employed by Great Britain in response to the Argentinean 
seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1982, widely viewed as a legitimate exercise of 
individual self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter, is a good 
illustration of a defensive use of force to settle an international dispute resulting 
in an international armed conflict meeting most definitions of “war.” 
116 NONAKA & URABE, supra note 110, at 127; HATAKE, supra note 105, at 68–69. 
117 DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 83–84. 
118 The English language text would also suggest a possible argument that 
the “as a means of settling international disputes” clause only qualifies the term 
“threat or use of force” and not the “war as a sovereign right of the nation,” but 
the Japanese version, which is controlling, less ambiguously qualifies both. 
119 MacArthur later denied that this was his intention, but his denial must be 
viewed with some skepticism given that the revisionist perspective was first 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/4
2008] BINDING THE DOGS OF WAR 313 
 
The argument that the Ashida amendment, specifically the “in 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” clause, 
qualifies the scope of the prohibition of maintaining “land, sea, and 
air forces, and other war potential” to mean only those forces that 
could be used in aggressive war, is thus difficult to sustain.  As 
already seen from the drafting history examined above, such an 
interpretation was neither intended nor understood to be so 
intended by the ratifiers.  Moreover, the argument depends 
entirely upon Article 9(1) being interpreted as prohibiting only 
aggressive war, which, as discussed above, is itself very difficult.  
Finally, as a practical matter it is simply impossible to 
meaningfully distinguish between military forces that are for the 
purpose of defensive as opposed to aggressive uses of force,120 and 
it is difficult to impose upon a constitutional provision an 
interpretation that is not capable of enforcement. 
These arguments are, however, almost definitively supported 
by a careful consideration of the meaning of the clause on the 
rights of belligerency, which forms the second distinct idea in 
Article 9(2).  Belligerency is a concept from the laws of 
international armed conflict (“LOIAC”) or jus in bello, and it is on 
this point that an analysis informed by an understanding of 
international law can correct errors in interpretation that have been 
frequently committed through a failure to properly consider the 
significance of this concept within Article 9.121  Put simply, 
 
provided in congressional committee hearings, during a deepening Cold War, in 
which the United States was increasing pressure on Japan to re-arm. 
120 This point is commonly and forcefully made in Japanese scholarship on 
this issue.  See, e.g., ASHIBE, supra note 76, at 274–81 (discussing the difficulty in 
differentiating between defensive and aggressive uses of force); NONAKA & URABE, 
supra note 110, at 127–30 (same). 
121 See, e.g., HATAKE, supra note 105, at 87–88 (providing a detailed account of 
both theories); ASHIBE, supra note 76, at 283–84; URABE NORIHO, KENPŌGAKU 
KYŌSHITSU [A CLASS ON THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION] 415–16 (2d ed. 2006); and 
NONAKA & URABE, supra note 110, at 130.  Yet not only do many who write on 
Article 9 ignore the significance of the clause, but many accept the first theory in 
passing.  That view is inconsistent with the international law concepts from which 
the clause clearly was drawn and violates normal rules of construction, since it 
would make this clause in Article 9(2) a redundant repetition of the purport of 
Art. 9(1).  But see TAMURA SHIGENOBU ET AL., NIHON NO BŌEIHŌSEI [THE NATIONAL 
DEFENSE LEGAL SYSTEM OF JAPAN] (2008) (advancing the argument that the rights of 
belligerency are indeed the rights applying to combatant forces of belligerent 
states, but that the use of a minimum level of force necessary for self-defense, 
even where it involves the killing and destruction of enemy forces, involves a 
concept distinct from that of the rights of belligerency.  That concept is not, 
however, more clearly defined).  To its credit, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
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belligerency is a legal status that is assumed by a state upon the 
commencement of armed conflict.  When, as a matter of law, 
international armed conflict may be said to have commenced, the 
states involved in that conflict assume the status of belligerent and 
thereby are subject to all the rights and obligations under the 
LOIAC, as defined in such conventions as the Hague Treaties and 
the Geneva Conventions.  Thus, the armed forces of belligerent 
states may legally employ lethal force against the military forces of 
enemy belligerents, are protected in their treatment if captured, are 
limited in the types of weapons they may employ, the nature of the 
targets they may destroy, and so forth.  Belligerent status not only 
triggers the LOIAC, but it suspends, or provides immunity from, 
the application of domestic law in various ways.  Thus, members 
of belligerent forces are not subject to the domestic criminal laws 
regarding murder and assault so long as they conduct themselves 
within the parameters of the LOIAC.122 
The language in Article 9(2), providing that the rights of 
belligerency will not be recognized, is therefore quite significant 
when considered in this context, both in terms of evidence of the 
drafters’ intent and its operation in practice.  It makes very clear 
that the intent of the drafters, MacArthur and Kades foremost 
amongst them (and as both a lawyer and a military officer, Kades 
certainly would have understood quite clearly the legal meaning of 
the term),123 was that Japanese forces were to be forever denied the 
rights of belligerency under the LOIAC.  If, as a matter of 
international law, Japanese forces could be denied the status of 
belligerency it would in essence deny Japan the ability to ever 
again engage in or be a participant in international armed conflict, 
whether it be in self-defense or as aggressor.  This intent clearly 
belies the notion that the American drafters had intended only to 
prohibit Japan’s participation in wars of aggression. 
 
(“CLB”) did articulate an interpretation of the rights of belligerency clause in 1956 
that reflected the jus in bello explanation, but this articulation is seldom referenced. 
122 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27–33 (2004) (outlining the requirements for 
lawful combatancy). 
123 But see MCNELLY, supra note 62, at 117 (writing that Kades did not 
understand the clause, which seems highly unlikely).  MacArthur’s 
understanding and intent is clear from the language in his original note, which 
reads, “no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese forces.” 
(italics added).  Id. at 116. 
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The rather strange feature of the clause, however, is that on its 
face it would seem to aspire to govern the operation of 
international law with respect to Japan’s status under the LOIAC.  
But it is settled law that a national constitution cannot alter a state’s 
obligations under international law, and this would apply equally 
to its status and rights.124  Whether Japan became a belligerent 
under international law would be governed by the LOIAC, and if it 
did, all the rights and obligations vis-à-vis the other belligerents 
would be triggered regardless of the operation of Article 9.  The 
enemy belligerents would be obliged, for instance, to treat 
captured Japanese forces pursuant to the requirements of the Third 
Geneva Convention, and would be fully justified in the expectation 
that Japan would equally observe its obligations under the LOIAC.  
In this sense then, the belligerency clause of Article 9(2) can be said 
to be ineffective on the plane of international law.  Indeed, when 
considered in the context of the drafters’ overall intent, it becomes 
apparent that this concept of jus in bello was being incorporated 
into the constitutional provision as a means of achieving objectives 
related to those of the jus ad bellum principles incorporated into 
Article 9(1), notwithstanding that these two regimes of 
international law are entirely separate and distinct. 
This does not end the analysis, however, or mean that the 
clause is of no legal effect.  In addition to providing important 
evidence of the intent of the drafters, the belligerency clause does 
have real legal significance in the area of Japanese domestic law, 
though this issue is seldom recognized or discussed.  Consider, for 
instance, a situation in which members of the Self Defense Force 
(“SDF”) use lethal force, either within Japanese territorial waters or 
on overseas deployment, in circumstances covered by the 
LOIAC.125  Normally combatants are immune from the application 
 
124 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (4th ed. 1990) 
(citing The Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in the Danzig Territory (Pol. v. Danzig), Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24 (Feb. 4) (codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331)). 
125 The Japanese Coast Guard, supported by the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(“MSDF”), did fire upon and sink what was suspected to be a North Korean “spy 
vessel” in December 2001, with the loss of approximately fifteen lives.  James 
Brooke, Koizumi Calls for Vigilance After Japan Sinks Suspicious Boat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2001, at A9.  Japan was criticized for having failed to come to the aid of 
the initial survivors, who were all thought to have eventually perished. 
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of domestic law.126  But where the constitution of the country 
denies the application of the rights of belligerency such immunity 
would not be available.  The members of the armed forces would 
still be governed by their obligations and enjoy their rights, vis-à-
vis the enemy, under international law, but they would have lost 
the protection that belligerent status would have provided as 
against the operation of the domestic criminal and civil laws.  SDF 
actions could become the subject of civil suits for wrongful death 
and the like, requiring the courts to determine the basis for their 
actions in light of the constitutional denial of the rights of 
belligerency.127  In short, the belligerency clause in Article 9(2) is 
not insignificant, and it cannot be ignored in the interpretation of 
Article 9. 
4.2. The Government Interpretation of Article 9 
As was alluded to earlier, the government interpretation differs 
significantly from the interpretation that has been elaborated here, 
 
126 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 124, at 29–31, 37.  One of the primary 
distinctions between lawful combatants, as defined under the LOIAC, and 
unlawful combatants, such as civilians who take up arms and become directly 
engaged in hostilities or members of the armed forces who disguise themselves as 
civilians, is this “right of belligerency,” this impunity under domestic law.  Thus 
unlawful combatants, as defined under the LOIAC, may be prosecuted in the 
domestic courts of the enemy for crimes under domestic criminal law, including 
murder and assault. 
127 When SDF forces were initially deployed under a reconstruction and 
humanitarian support mandate to Iraq in 2004, the authorizing law provided that 
the troops could only use their weapons in a manner and in situations that would 
satisfy the domestic criminal law test for use of force in self-defense.  This would 
be consistent with this understanding of Art. 9(2), and it is possible that the CLB 
insisted on the provision for this purpose.  The legal limit itself can be found in 
Iraku ni okeru jindōfukkō shienkatsudō oyobi anzen kakuho shienkatsudō no 
jikkō ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō [The Special Measures Law Concerning the 
Conduct of Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Activities for 
Assisting in the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Iraq], Law No. 137 of 2003 
[hereinafter Iraq SML], art. 27(4), (specifying that weapons could only be used in 
circumstances justified by Art. 36 and Art. 37 of the penal code).  See HATAKE, 
supra note 105, at 260–63 (providing a detailed chart describing the circumstances 
under which SDF members may use weapons and the legal authority for each); 
TAMURA ET AL., supra note 121, at 211 (offering a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between the use of weapons and the use of force in current defense-
related legislation).  On the other hand, senior officials in both the Ministry of 
Defense (interview July 31, 2008) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview Aug. 
13, 2008), both involved in creating defense related legislation, suggested that the 
dominant view was that such limitations were driven by the perceived 
requirement to comply with the prohibition on the use of force in Article 9(1). 
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and it is the government interpretation that governs policy making.  
The government interpretation has been subject to some change 
over time, though it has remained fairly consistent in its essentials 
since 1954 as related to Article 9(1).  It will be recalled that Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru had taken the position during the 
ratification that Japan was not necessarily denied the right of self-
defense, but that it was denied the right to maintain even the most 
limited military forces necessary for self-defense.  His government 
maintained that position, against mounting pressure both inside 
the party and from the United States, until 1954, when the force 
that had been established as a National Police Reserve was 
transformed into the SDF.  The Legislation Bureau was re-
established by Yoshida as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), 
and he turned to it for the supporting interpretation of Article 9.128  
It would become the primary authority on the interpretation of 
Article 9, and the arbiter of what was consistent with that 
interpretation.  It issued its first interpretation of the provision in 
December of 1954 in order to justify the creation of the SDF. 
The CLB interpretation provided that while Article 9(1) 
renounced war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes, it was not understood to renounce Japan’s 
right, as a sovereign nation, of individual self-defense.  Moreover, 
it was natural for a country with a right of self-defense to have the 
capability to defend its national territory in the event that it came 
under foreign attack, and thus it was natural that Article 9(2) was 
not to be understood to prohibit the maintenance of the defensive 
capability “necessary” for self-defense.  As such, the “necessary” 
defense capability did not constitute the land, sea, and air forces or 
other war potential that was prohibited by Article 9(2).129  In 1957, 
 
128 The Legislation Bureau had been disbanded by SCAP in 1947 but was 
restored as the CLB by Yoshida in 1952.  See NISHIKAWA SHINICHI, SHIRAREZARU 
KANCHŌ: NAIKAKU HŌSEIKYOKU [THE UNKNOWN AGENCY: THE CABINET LEGISLATION 
BUREAU] ch. 2 (2000); see also NAKAMURA AKIRA, SENGOSEIJI NI YURETA KENPŌ KYŪJŌ 
– NAIKAKU HŌSIEKYOKU NO JISHIN TSUYŌSA [ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION ROCKED 
BY POST WAR POLITICS: THE STRENGTH AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE CABINET 
LEGISLATION BUREAU] ch. 1 (1996); Richard J. Samuels, Politics, Security Policy, and 
Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway? (Japanese 
Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 99, 2004), available at 
http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp99.html. 
129 This interpretation was provided by Director Hayashi in the House of 
Representatives Budget Committee deliberations, on December 21, 1954.  See 
NISHIKAWA, supra note 128, at 40; see generally Samuels, supra note 128, at 24–29 
(tracing the development of the “minimum necessary force” doctrine). 
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the CLB refined and narrowed the interpretation further, opining 
that defense capability that was “the minimum necessary force” for 
the exercise of self-defense was not war potential,130 from which 
flowed the position that Japan was entitled not only to maintain 
but also use the “minimum necessary force” for self-defense. 
It is understood that this interpretation—so as to permit an 
individual right of self-defense—was based on some of the ideas 
that were discussed above, particularly the fact that there had been 
a self-defense exception created for the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
Moreover, the interpretation of Article 9(2) as permitting a level of 
capability necessary for self-defense was founded on the Ashida 
amendment.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
interpretation was made in the context of extreme pressure on the 
government from the United States to re-arm.  But while it has 
been viscerally assailed as being contrary to any reasonable 
interpretation of the provision, and castigated for beginning the 
process of emasculating Article 9, particularly as it relates to 
Article 9(2),131 the CLB interpretation was also extremely 
significant in terms of the constraints that it entrenched.  For while 
along with defining what was permissible, the interpretation made 
clear what was not, including collective self-defense, collective 
security operations, or indeed any dispatch of military forces 
overseas.  These prohibitions flowed directly from the “minimum 
necessary force” construction.132 
While debate has raged for decades over what, precisely, a 
“minimum necessary force” might mean in practical terms, 
whether the SDF has exceeded it, and what value the concept has 
as a constraint given that it is entirely relative and dependent on 
perceptions of foreign threat levels, the fact remains that the CLB 
 
130 Prime Minister Kishi provided this interpretation in the House of 
Councilors Cabinet Committee on May 7, 1957.  NISHIKAWA, supra note 128, at 41. 
131 For the discussion in English, see Port, supra note 93, at 128.  See generally 
James E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
69, 74–80 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993) (examining the 
extent to which Japan’s military development is inconsistent with Article 9(2)).  
There is a massive body of literature in Japanese criticizing the interpretation and 
government policy on Article 9. 
132 This point is made quite forcefully by John Haley.  See Haley, Waging War, 
supra note 81, at 29–33 (noting that the “prevailing view [is that] article 9 prohibits 
any deployment of combat forces for collective security measures in the absence 
of a direct threat to Japanese security,” and arguing that “Japan’s contemporary 
military establishment is, as a matter of capability, essentially defensive”); see also 
NISHIKAWA, supra note 128, at 46. 
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has been remarkably consistent in its adherence to the fundamental 
interpretation of the “use of force” aspect of the interpretation.  
While there has been some whittling away of the prohibition on 
the overseas dispatch of troops, and the conditions under which 
Japan might be able to provide rear-area support to the United 
States in crisis circumstances in “areas surrounding Japan,”133 the 
fundamental prohibition on participation in collective self-defense 
or U.N.-authorized collective security operations has been 
assiduously maintained.134  Even when the limitations were 
relaxed with respect to the dispatch of troops for U.N. 
peacekeeping missions, and to provide logistical support for such 
operations as the post-9/11 coalition activities in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, stringent conditions on their operations were designed and 
implemented to keep their conduct within the scope of the broader 
constitutional interpretation.135 
It bears repeating again, therefore, that in considering the 
operation of Article 9, it is necessary to keep in sharp focus the 
distinction between the two subsections.  While the official 
interpretation of Article 9(2) may strain credulity, and the size of 
Japan’s military budget and capability of its military is completely 
at odds with any reasonable interpretation of Article 9(2), those 
problems are separate and distinct from the question of how well 
Article 9 operationalizes the principles of jus ad bellum.  In order to 
address that question better, it is necessary to consider the extent to 
which Article 9(1), as interpreted by the government, continues to 
be consistent with international law. 
4.3. Interpretations of Article 9(1) and Consistency with International 
Law 
As explained earlier, concerns were raised in the ratification 
process about how Article 9 could be reconciled with the new U.N. 
system.  There were two issues—two perceived conflicts—that 
were raised then, and have continued to be at the center of debate 
 
133 The “rear-area support” and “situations in areas surrounding Japan” are 
concepts articulated in the 1997 Guidelines, which are discussed in the next 
section. 
134 The CLB reinforced its interpretation in 1981, explicitly stating that 
participation in collective self-defense was prohibited by Article 9(1).  See 
Samuels, supra note 128, at 30–31 (providing a more complete account of the CLB 
interpretation). 
135 Details of these operations are provided below. 
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over the provision ever since.  These were the right of self-defense, 
both individual and collective, and the obligation to contribute to 
the U.N. collective security operations.  The issue of collective self-
defense was further complicated with the assumption by Japan of 
treaty obligations under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Beginning with self-defense, the U.N. Charter, which came into 
effect in October 1945, provided in Article 51 that nothing in the 
Charter impaired the “inherent right” to individual and collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member.136  This 
created one of the two exceptions to the general prohibition on the 
use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the Charter, and it thus 
codifies two distinct rights:  the right of individual self-defense, 
and the right of collective self-defense.  The former is quite simply 
the right of a member of the U.N. to use force individually against 
an aggressor in the event of an armed attack.  The right of 
individual self-defense, it should be noted, may also be exercised 
collectively, in that a number of states may all end up defending 
themselves against a single aggressor or group of aggressors, but 
to the extent this right is primarily focused on a defense of one’s 
own narrow interests in response to an attack on one’s own forces 
or territory, it remains individual self-defense.137 
The right of collective self-defense is more complicated, as it 
involves a right to use force against an aggressor in the event of an 
armed attack by that aggressor on some other U.N. member or 
members.  It does not require that there have been an attack on the 
state exercising the right, nor even that there be some immediate 
threat to the security interests of that state, but only that there have 
been an armed attack against another member of the U.N.138  Thus, 
 
136 U.N. Charter art. 51.  It is sometimes argued, both in the Article 9 debate 
and more broadly, that the use of the word “inherent” in the definition reflects the 
independent existence of the right of self-defense as a concept in customary 
international law; this implies that the right may be broader than what is 
provided for in the Charter.  The better view is that Article 51 represents the 
codification of customary international law, and covers the entire scope of the 
right, including the conditions for its exercise.  See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 
181 (“The allegation that the prerogative of self-defense is inherent in the 
sovereignty of State to such an extent that no treaty can derogate from it, cannot 
be accepted.”) (internal citation omitted). 
137 For a sound review of the concepts, see DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 175–277 
(discussing the doctrines of individual and collective self-defense); see also 
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 95–158 (2d ed. 2004) 
(offering a similar background). 
138 There is disagreement over whether a request for assistance from the 
victim of aggression is also a necessary condition.  The International Court of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/4
2008] BINDING THE DOGS OF WAR 321 
 
if the Congo were to attack Rwanda, Canada (or any other member 
of the U.N.) would be entitled to use force against the aggressor as 
an exercise of the right of collective self-defense provided for in 
Article 51 of the Charter, regardless of the existence of any treaties 
or other relations between Rwanda and Canada.  The underlying 
rationale for this framework is that there is a broader threat to 
international peace and security from any incidence of aggression, 
in that unchecked aggression has a propensity to spread and cause 
other external costs, and every state thus has a right to defend itself 
against such threats.139 
It will be noted, however, that this exception to the general 
prohibition on the use of force is a right, but not a duty.140  To the 
extent that Article 9 could be interpreted as denying the right of 
self-defense (whether individual, collective, or both) it would be 
inconsistent with the rights extended to Japan under international 
law, but it would not interfere with any general obligations or 
duties imposed upon Japan under the U.N. system.  And one is 
always free to waive one’s rights. Thus, the government 
interpretation of Article 9—that it is entitled to exercise the right of 
individual self-defense, but is prohibited from exercising the right 
of collective self-defense—is not inconsistent with any obligation 
or duty under the international law of the U.N. system. 
Where problems arise with respect to collective self-defense is 
with the treaty obligations that Japan has assumed in the 1952 U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty.  The 1952 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself 
recognized in its preamble that Japan lacked the “effective means 
to exercise its inherent right of self-defense,” but also adverted to 
 
Justice, in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27), suggested that at a minimum it was a requirement that the victim make the 
determination that it had been the subject of an armed attack, and so declare.  For 
further discussion, see GRAY, supra note 137, at 138–41. 
139 See DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 253–56 (discussing the doctrine and noting 
that “from the vantage point of minor Powers . . . their overall security is 
detrimentally affected when one of them is invaded by a potent aggressor.”). 
140 There has been some suggestion, given expression by the ICJ in Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5), that the 
outlawing of aggression has created international obligations erga omnes, but the 
prevailing view is that self-defense is a right and not a duty.  See DINSTEIN, supra 
note 4, at 254 (discussing the implications of Barcelona Traction); see also GRAY, 
supra note 137, at 135–58 (giving a detailed analysis of the conditions for collective 
self-defense and the debates surrounding the issue). 
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its right to collective self-defense as a basis for the treaty.141  Then, 
in the Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 (an 
agreement designed both to institutionalize the treaty, and 
establish a framework for the provision of increased economic 
assistance to Japan), Japan undertook to take such action as was 
required to fulfill its “military obligations” under the treaty, and to 
increasingly contribute to the “development and maintenance of its 
own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free 
world” (though in accordance with its constitutional constraints), 
thus putting pressure on Article 9(2).142 
When the treaty was revised and renewed in 1960, the 
preamble of the amended treaty again recognized the right of 
collective self-defense as the basis for the agreement, and Japan 
made a more explicit undertaking to develop its defensive 
capability.143  But in the core of the bargain, Article V specified that 
both states agreed to act in the event that either of them were the 
subject of an armed attack “in the territories under the 
administration of Japan,”144 which at the time did not even include 
Okinawa.  Thus, while the United States undertook to defend 
Japan in the event of an attack against Japan, Japan only agreed to 
use force in defense of the United States if U.S. forces were 
attacked within the territory of Japan—which would also 
constitute an attack on Japan, and thus trigger the right to 
individual self-defense.  Nonetheless, there were a number of other 
institutional developments pursuant to the 1960 Security Treaty, 
such as the development of the Security Consultative Committee, 
which established and facilitated the high-level coordination of 
defense planning, and became the conduit for pressure upon Japan 
 
141 Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, U.S.-
Japan, pmbl., Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter 1952 Security Treaty].  For 
discussion of the treaty, see TSUYOSHI MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, THE MAKING OF AN 
ALLIANCE: JAPAN’S ALLIANCE POLICY 1945–1952 (1999); THOMAS A. DROHAN, 
AMERICAN-JAPANESE SECURITY AGREEMENTS, PAST AND PRESENT 61–70 (2007); and 
SAKAMOTO KAZUYA, NICHIBEI DŌMEI NO KIZUNA [The Bond of the Japan-U.S. 
Alliance] (Tokyo, 2000). 
142 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of 
America and Japan, U.S.-Japan, art. VIII, Mar. 8, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 661 [hereinafter 
MDAA]. 
143 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, art. III, Jan. 19, 
1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632 [hereinafter 1960 Security Treaty]. 
 144  Id. art V. 
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to do more to actively support U.S. security interests in East 
Asia.145 
It was through these institutional developments intended to 
implement and update the treaty relationship, and specifically 
within the Security Consultative Committee, that the so-called 1997 
Guidelines were negotiated.146  The 1997 Guidelines were intended 
in general terms to clarify the responsibility of each side in the 
relationship.147  In its particulars, the responsibilities of Japan in the 
event of armed attack were far more detailed but remained 
consistent with the provisions of the 1960 Security Treaty.  But at 
lower levels of crisis the 1997 Guidelines stipulated that the SDF 
would coordinate with and provide rear-area support for U.S. 
forces in the event that there were “[s]ituations in areas 
surrounding Japan [that] will have an important influence on 
Japan’s peace and security,” also referred to as “situations 
surrounding Japan.”148  The term “situations surrounding Japan” 
was explicitly described as being a “situational” concept, rather 
than geographic.149 
The 1997 Guidelines, and the legislation that was passed in 
1999 to implement them,150 were highly controversial because they 
were seen (as they are still seen by many academics and policy 
makers today) as an effort to blur the lines between individual and 
collective self-defense.  It is argued that “situations surrounding 
 
145 DROHAN, supra note 141, at 85. 
146 Joint Statement in Review of U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 
U.S.-Japan, Sept. 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1621, 1624 [hereinafter the 1997 Guidelines].  
These were a successor agreement to a set of guidelines agreed to in 1978.  For 
more on the 1997 Guidelines generally, see KAZUHIKO TOGO, JAPAN’S FOREIGN 
POLICY 1945–2003, at 78–85 (2d ed. 2005); CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES, JAPAN’S RE-
EMERGENCE AS A ‘NORMAL’ MILITARY POWER, 100–01 (Routledge 2006); DROHAN, 
supra note 141, at 143–51.  For more detailed analysis of the legal significance of 
the 1997 Guidelines see, e.g., Robert A. Fisher, The Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The 
Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 393, 
395–96 (1999); NICHIBEI SHINGAIDORAIN TO SHUHEN JITAIHŌ [Japan-U.S. New 
Guidelines and the Surrounding Situations Law] (Yamauchi Toshihiro ed., 1999); 
HATAKE, supra note 105, at 129; TAMURA, supra note 121, ch. 10. 
147 DROHAN, supra note 141, at 143–45. 
148 1997 Guidelines, supra note 146, Part V. 
 149  Id. 
150 There are several laws that implemented aspects of the 1997 Guidelines, 
but the most important is the Shūhennjitai ni saishite wagakuni no heiwa oyobi anzen 
wo kakuho suru tame no sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Related to the Measures for 
the Guarantee of Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan], Law No. 60 
of 1999, as amended. 
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Japan” could include situations such as crises in the Middle East, 
and that once such a crisis is so defined, the SDF could be 
authorized to provide rear-area support for U.S. forces engaged in 
the use of force in response to the situation.  The SDF activity in 
such circumstances could easily be integral to the U.S. use of force, 
thus constituting an exercise of collective self-defense and the use 
of force in violation of Article 9(1).151 
There is certainly some merit to these claims, and the 
arguments that the government has engaged in the use of highly 
ambiguous language to make incremental shifts in the 
understanding of the scope of permissible military activity.  These 
are legitimate concerns for the domestic constitutional scholars, 
policy makers, and the citizens of Japan regarding the integrity of 
the constitutional provision.  Yet the crucial point for the purposes 
of the analysis in this Paper is that even if there is a complete shift 
in the interpretation of Article 9 so as to permit collective self-
defense, it would not make the government’s interpretation 
inconsistent with the principles of jus ad bellum—rather it would 
bring it more into conformity with the U.N. system.  Such a shift 
would raise questions about how strong the bind of Article 9 can 
be if the government can re-interpret its way around the 
constraints, and that argument is addressed in the next section.  
The current interpretation, however, and the manner in which 
Article 9 operates, is not inconsistent with Japan’s international law 
obligations, and does not inhibit the operation of Article 9(1) so as 
to enhance compliance with jus ad bellum. 
The second major issue in the ratification process was how 
Article 9 would affect Japan’s ability to join the U.N. if it precluded 
Japan from contributing to the collective security operations 
contemplated by Chapter VII.  That issue—which, it will be 
recalled, was sidestepped at the time by the government as being a 
problem that could be dealt with later—has continued to be 
enormously problematic ever since.  Chapter VII of the Charter sets 
out a collective security system that is the basis for the second 
exception to the general prohibition on the use of force.  Under 
Article 39, the U.N. Security Council has the authority to make a 
determination that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the 
 
151 See, e.g., NISHIKAWA, supra note 128, at 48–50.  The Nagoya High Court, in 
a decision that is discussed further below, made exactly such a determination in 
respect of Air Self-Defense Force (hereinafter ASDF) operations in support of 
coalition forces in Iraq in 2008. 
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peace, or an act of aggression, and to make decisions and 
recommendations as to what measures shall be taken to address 
such situations.  Under Article 42, it may take or authorize action 
by the land, sea, or air forces of its members, in order to restore and 
maintain international peace and security. 
The concept of collective security operations is thus quite 
distinct from that of self-defense.  The use of force as a collective 
security measure requires a Security Council determination that 
there exists a threat to international peace and security and a 
Security Council authorization to use force, whereas the use of 
force in self-defense is a right available to members without any 
further specific authority; but while collective security action is 
permitted when the Security Council, in its broad discretion, has 
determined there to be a threat to peace and security, the legitimate 
exercise of self-defense requires the satisfaction of specified 
conditions precedent, namely that an armed attack has occurred or 
is inexorably in motion.152 
At the time that the draft Constitution was being considered in 
the Privy Council and the Diet, it was still contemplated that U.N. 
members would be required to contribute armed forces to a U.N. 
collective security force under U.N. command if called upon to do 
so by the Security Council, in accordance with agreements that 
were to be entered into between each state and the U.N.153  Thus, 
there was concern among the Japanese legislators that if Japan was 
not able to contribute armed forces to this U.N. force, as required 
by Article 43 of the Charter, Japan would not be able to join the 
U.N. when its sovereignty was fully restored.  Alternatively, there 
was concern that if Japan joined it would be forced to violate this 
obligation.  However, the vision of a standing U.N. force as 
contemplated by Article 43 never came to pass, and instead the 
model of national armed forces acting jointly under U.N. Security 
Council authorization as collective security forces, was established 
 
152 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 182–211 (laying out the guidelines 
for the use of self-defense under Article 51); GRAY, supra note 137, at 98–129 
(examining the academic debate surrounding Article 51 and the role of the 
Security Council under Article 51).  There is of course considerable debate over 
precisely what are the pre-conditions to the exercise of self-defense, which became 
more vociferous after the invasion of Iraq and the assertion of the right to 
preventative war. 
153 See U.N. Charter art. 43. 
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with the U.S.-led response to the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea in 1950.154 
When Japan joined the U.N. in 1956, therefore, there was no 
obligation to contribute to a U.N. standing force.  Moreover, 
notwithstanding the language of Article 43, the Security Council 
has never called upon any specific nation to contribute forces to 
any collective security operation, and the participation of member 
states is viewed as being voluntary.  As such, it cannot be argued 
that Article 9 is inconsistent with the jus ad bellum regime as it is 
currently operating, or that Article 9 puts Japan in violation of its 
international law obligations within the U.N. system. 
Certainly, as will be examined in more detail below, Japan 
came under increasing pressure after the end of the Cold War, 
particularly from the United States, to contribute militarily to such 
international efforts as those related to the first Gulf War, and the 
invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 and the subsequent 
counterinsurgency operations in that country.  To the extent that 
aspects of such conflicts were authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council under Article 42,155 there was renewed debate in Japan 
over whether Article 9 really prohibited collective security 
operations, and if so, whether it ought not to be revised or 
reinterpreted.156  There was the increasing feeling that if it was not 
an obligation, it was certainly a responsibility of members of the 
 
154 See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and 
the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 621–40 (1993) (re-examining in detail the legal 
authority for the U.S.-led response in Korea). 
155 Both the military response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the post-9/11 
operations in Afghanistan were justified in terms of collective self-defense under 
Article 51, and (at least in some aspects) as collective security operations under 
Article 42.  In the case of Afghanistan there was no U.N. Security Council 
resolution authorizing the initial invasion, but the use of force by the International 
Security Assistance Force (hereinafter ISAF) was authorized under Article 42 to 
restore and maintain security in Afghanistan thereafter.  But see DINSTEIN, supra 
note 4, at 273–76 (arguing that the U.N. Security Council did not, in Resolution 
678, transform Operation Desert Storm from an exercise of collective self-defense 
to one of U.N.-authorized collective security). 
156 Many have argued that in fact Article 9 can be interpreted as allowing for 
the use of force in Security Council authorized security operations, on such 
grounds as that the “purpose” of such operations is not to resolve international 
disputes, or that the SDF units so participating would no longer be under 
Japanese command and control.  See, e.g., Nasu, supra note 105, at 59–60 (“The 
Japanese SDF contingents deployed pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions 
are thus placed under the U.N. command and, therefore . . . cannot be considered 
to be the use of armed force by the Japanese Government.”).  Based on the 
analysis in the previous section, such arguments are not persuasive. 
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U.N. (particularly prosperous and politically influential members 
with ambitions to become permanent members of the Security 
Council) to contribute to such efforts.  But while there may be a 
perceived moral obligation and strong political reasons to 
participate in collective security operations, there is no legal 
obligation per se; as a result, this perceived inconsistency between 
Article 9 and international law does not directly impact on the 
operation of Article 9 as a prohibition on the use of force. 
In essence, when one steps back from the minutiae of the 
endless debate over interpretation, it can be said without much 
controversy that to the extent that Article 9 incorporated principles 
from the laws of war, it was overly inclusive (or overly exclusive, 
depending on one’s perspective) in that the scope of its prohibition 
was greater than that of international law, both then and now.  
That over-breadth, and the penumbra that it has created beyond 
the core area that corresponds with international law, has been the 
source of many of the conflicts over the provision, and it may be a 
basis for justifiable criticism—but it does not invalidate the core 
area of the provision that corresponds with the jus ad bellum 
principles.  The over-breadth may ultimately be the undoing of the 
provision, but as will be examined in the next section, the core of 
Article 9(1) has operated to effectively prevent Japan from 
participating in any use of armed force since World War II. 
5.  ARTICLE 9 AS A CONSTRAINT ON POLICY 
We come then to an examination of the evidence of how Article 
9(1) has actually operated to constrain government policy with 
respect to the use of armed force.  The question of how effectively 
it has functioned is more complicated than might first appear.  The 
general account illustrates very clearly that Japan has not used 
armed force, or deployed military forces as combatants in any form 
whatsoever, since World War II,157 even in the face of international 
criticism of its refusal to be drawn into either collective self-defense 
or collective security operations.  The constitutional constraints of 
 
157 Whether the SDF units deployed to the Indian Ocean in support of 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are combatants is not entirely unambiguous, 
and there are reasonable arguments that they could be treated as belligerents.  The 
Nagoya High Court in April 2008 held that the ASDF operations in Iraq were so 
integrated with those of coalition forces engaged in the use of force that they also 
constituted the use of armed force.  Nagoya High Court, Apr. 17, 2008 
(unpublished decision), http://www.haheisashidome.jp/hanketsu_kouso 
[hereinafter Nagoya Decision]. 
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Article 9 have always been the primary publicly advanced reason 
for the policy decisions that were taken in the unfolding of that 
history.  Yet the political subtext is more complicated, and one 
must try to disentangle the extent to which Article 9 was simply 
used cynically by the government as a convenient and powerful 
cover for more self-interested reasons for these decisions from 
those instances in which Article 9 operated to truly frustrate the 
policy objectives of government. 
It cannot be argued that Article 9 has effectively operated to 
bind government policy, and thus that it provides a useful example 
of constitutional implementation of international law constraints 
on the use of armed force, if it was merely an excuse for the 
adoption of policy that was seen by the government of the day as 
furthering either national or more narrow party interests.  And 
there were periods during the last sixty years in which that was the 
case.  There is of course room to make the argument that even if 
this is so, Article 9 did nonetheless function effectively as a 
constraint, in that if Article 9 had not existed, the government 
would not have had the powerful tool that the provision provided, 
and thus might have been unable to resist the pressure to adopt a 
policy which it was reluctant to follow.  Those arguments are not 
without some merit, but it would obviously be more powerful to 
find evidence of Article 9 operating to frustrate and defeat genuine 
government efforts to move the nation toward the use of military 
force, for then we will have examples of a constitutional constraint 
on the use of armed force effectively binding government, even in 
a moment of crisis.  Here we will find Ulysses straining against the 
bonds of pre-commitment in the full face of the Sirens’ song. 
Such evidence will be explored in this Section of the Paper, but 
first it is important to examine the context, and explain the early 
policies that both used Article 9 as a cynical cover and 
inadvertently entrenched its norms further into the social and legal 
fabric of the nation. 
5.1. The Yoshida Doctrine and Entrenchment of Pacifism 
It will be recalled that the government had taken the position 
during the ratification process that Article 9(2) prohibited all 
military forces, and thus made the exercise of the right of self-
defense impossible.  The government continued to maintain that 
position, supported by strong pressure on the left, until well after 
the beginning of the Korean War.  However, SCAP and the U.S. 
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government had second thoughts about a disarmed Japan as the 
Cold War began to deepen, and began to bring increasing pressure 
to bear on the Yoshida government to rearm.  Even when the 
government had complied with the SCAP directive to establish a 
75,000 man National Police Reserve (“NPR”) in 1950, after the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June of that year, Yoshida 
maintained the position that military forces per se would violate 
Article 9.  He maintained that position in the face of pressure from 
Dulles to re-establish a military.158  The question of Japan’s security 
and future posture were thus the subject of significant debate in 
the run-up to the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in September 1951.159 
Rather than any idealistic commitment to pacifism or the 
renunciation of armed forces in the Constitution, Yoshida’s 
broader national and foreign policy objectives animated this 
course.  This would in time become known as the “Yoshida 
Doctrine,” and it involved a single-minded focus on economic 
recovery and growth, avoidance of Cold War entanglements, 
minimal possible defense spending, reliance upon a strong alliance 
with the United States to ensure Japanese security, and exploitation 
of the developing liberal trade regime to drive economic growth.  
Moreover, Yoshida was quite prepared to use the Constitution and 
the strong pacifist movement within Japan to aid in the 
development of his policies.160  As he remarked to his junior aid at 
the time (and future prime minister), Miyazawa Kiichi: 
 
158 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and the Future of Collective Security, in JAPAN’S 
EMERGING GLOBAL ROLE 99, 102  (Danny Unger & Paul Blackburn eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter Pyle, Collective Security].  See also KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING: THE 
RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE POWER AND PURPOSE 229–30 (2007) [hereinafter PYLE, 
JAPAN RISING] (tracing Yoshida’s maneuverings with Dulles and noting that 
“Yoshida’s firmness spared Japanese military involvement in the Korean War”); 
TOGO, supra note 146, at 52–53 (also describing Yoshida's early resistance to 
American pressure to re-arm). 
159 See TOGO, supra note 146, at 46–51 (outlining the background history of the 
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty).  Even MacArthur was opposed to Japanese re-
armament until well after 1948, and resisted efforts by George Kennan, the then-
head of the State Department Planning Staff, to have him authorize re-armament.  
SHŌICHI, supra note 62, at 201. 
160 For more on the Yoshida Doctrine, see generally PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra 
note 158, at 225–77 and RICHARD SAMUELS, SECURING JAPAN: TOKYO’S GRAND 
STRATEGY AND THE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA 38–59 (2007) (tracing the history and 
development of the Yoshida Doctrine). 
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The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our 
livelihood recovers.  It may seem devious [zurui], but let the 
Americans handle our security until then.  It is indeed our 
Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the constitution bans 
arms.  If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us 
a perfect justification [chanto shita riyu ni naru].  The 
politicians who want to amend it are fools.161 
Nonetheless, the Japanese government could not entirely resist 
American pressure.162  As discussed earlier, in the Japan Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 (“the MDAA”), Japan 
explicitly undertook to increase its own defensive capabilities.163  
The Yoshida government in that same year transformed what had 
initially been the NPR, and then the National Security Force, into a 
full-fledged Defense Agency and a tri-service SDF; although at 
110,000 men it was less than half the size the Americans had 
pressed for.164 
This required a departure from the government’s earlier 
position on the meaning and import of Article 9.  As was described 
earlier, Yoshida turned to the CLB for an interpretation of Article 9 
that would support the shift. 165 That interpretation provided the 
basis for establishing a self-defense capability.  It also clearly 
articulated and thereby reinforced the understanding of the 
constraints of Article 9, namely that collective security operations 
and collective self-defense were prohibited.166 
 
161 Pyle, Collective Security, supra note 158, at 102. 
162 This pressure was manifested in various ways, most publicly with then-
Vice President Richard Nixon telling a crowd of 700 Japanese leaders that Article 
9 had been a mistake and that the United States needed Japan to re-arm.  WALTER 
LAFEBER, THE CLASH: U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS THROUGHOUT HISTORY 298 (1997).  
For more on U.S. pressure to rearm, see SAKAMOTO, supra note 141, at 76. 
163 MDAA, supra note 142, art. VIII.  The United States had helped cajole a 
reluctant Yoshida into the deal with $250 million in goods and purchases.  
LAFEBER, supra note 162, at 299; see also PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 234–
35 (describing the use of economic aid by the United States to leverage the 
establishment of a self defense force by the Yoshida government). 
164 PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 234. 
165 CLB Director General Masaki Takatsuji acknowledged in his memoirs that 
he gave in to the pressure from Yoshida in developing an interpretation in 1954.  
Samuels, supra note 128, at 5. 
166 See id. at 7.  See also PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 236 (emphasizing 
that Yoshida sought the interpretation not only as a justification for the formation 
of the SDF, but as a basis for resisting U.S. pressure).  Haley also makes the point 
that this entrenched the constraints of Article 9.  Haley, supra note 81, at 22–23. 
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In the midst of the issuance of these interpretations, and the 
fierce debates in the Diet and within the public over the 
establishment of the SDF, Japan was trying to join the U.N.  This 
brought to a head the issues regarding Article 9 constraints on 
Japan’s ability to contribute to U.N. collective security 
operations.167  When Japan finally joined the U.N. in 1956, it did so 
with the reservation that its ability to meets its obligations was 
qualified.168  True to the CLB interpretation that no troops could be 
deployed overseas, Japan refused the first request for observers for 
the U.N. missions in Jordan and Lebanon.169 
While these developments established the early government 
policies on defense and the official interpretation of Article 9, they 
were also the subject of considerable conflict in the latter half of the 
decade.  The fight over the issues surrounding the normative 
values of Article 9 were reflected in direct conflicts over the 
Constitution itself, and in political struggles over the direction of 
the country and its place in the world.  The struggle was very 
much centered on the pacifism that had been institutionalized in 
Article 9 and embraced by many as being a component of Japan’s 
new national identity.  The conservative reactionaries who viewed 
the Constitution as an illegitimate imposition, and Japan’s 
dependency on the United States as shameful, sought to revise the 
Constitution and restore the military.170 
The constitutional struggle was focused in the deliberations of 
the Commission on the Constitution, established in 1957 (the “‘57 
Commission”), under the chairmanship of Takayanagi Kenzō.  The 
political movement to create the commission began in 1954, and 
the law authorizing its formation was passed by the newly formed 
 
167 TOGO, supra note 146, at 374. 
168 The reservation was communicated somewhat cryptically in a letter from 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which stated that Japan “undertakes to honour [its 
obligations] by all means at its disposal,” which was interpreted to mean so far as 
its Constitution permitted.  Id.  This position was reiterated by the Director 
General of the Treaties Bureau, in the House of Councilors Settlement Committee 
in 1990, and Foreign Minister Ikeda, in the House of Representatives Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1996.  Id. 
169 Id. at 376–77. 
170 See PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 237–38 (describing the role public 
opposition played in preventing efforts by Yoshida’s conservative opponents to 
rebuild Japan’s military); see also KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 115 (exploring the 
influence of this constitutional conflict); TOGO, supra note 146, at 56–57 
(summarizing the history of this period).  See also BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 104, 
at 17–26 (analyzing the political dynamics of Japan in the 1950s). 
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Liberal Democratic Party under Prime Minister Hatoyama in 
1955.171  Hatoyama and his close allies, such as Kishi Nobusuke, 
were opposed to Yoshida’s approach to security and foreign 
policy, and sought a revision of the Constitution.  In the run up to 
the convening of the ‘57 Commission, the various parties worked 
on developing their respective positions on constitutional revision 
and the issues received much publicity.  Moreover, once the 
Commission began its deliberations all but the steering committee 
sessions were open to the public and were widely reported on in 
the press.172 
The deliberations of the ‘57 Commission lasted for seven years 
but it could come to no consensus on constitutional revision, and 
made no formal recommendations.  Its massive final report was 
submitted to the Cabinet in 1964, but it was never placed before the 
Diet and no action was ever taken on it.  While many on the ‘57 
Commission clearly favored revision of Article 9, the conflict was 
fought to a stalemate in which the status quo of adherence to the 
principles of pacifism remained in place.  In the final analysis, the 
work of the commission actually reinforced in the national psyche 
and public consciousness the constitutive norms articulated by 
Article 9.173 
The ‘57 Commission was in a very real sense symbolic of the 
larger conflict being waged within the body politic.174  Between 
1955 and 1960, the LDP, led first by Hatoyama and then by Kishi 
Nobusuke, tried to move Japan in a more conservative direction, 
emphasizing greater autonomy and a more independent foreign 
policy backed by a restored military, and of course a revised 
constitution to make this possible.  Kishi became prime minister in 
early 1957, and his government ushered in the first Basic Policy on 
National Defense later that year, which called for “the 
development of an efficient defence capability.”175  Kishi also 
 
171 The LDP was formed through the merger of the Democratic Party with the 
Liberal Party, shortly after the Democratic Party itself had been formed through 
the merger of the Progressive Party with the Hatoyama and Kishi factions of the 
Liberal Party. 
172 See JAPAN’S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 3 (John 
M. Maki ed., trans. 1980). 
173 See id. at 10, 271 (arguing that pacifism, along with the other two 
fundamental principles, are firmly embedded in the Japanese consciousness). 
174 Maki, supra note 44, at 11. 
175 TOGO, supra note 146, at 57.  He also managed to pressure the CLB into 
issuing an interpretation that nuclear weapons would not be in violation of Article 
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pushed hard for a revision to the Japan-U.S. Security Agreement, 
both to enhance the American guarantee of Japan’s security, and at 
the same time to increase the sovereign control Japan had over the 
operation of U.S. forces in Japan under the 1952 treaty.  But all of 
these developments were highly controversial at the time, and the 
political opposition characterized the renewal of the security treaty 
as creating a significant risk of Japan being re-militarized and 
drawn into U.S. wars of aggression.176 
Even Kishi’s government could not ignore the norms of Article 
9.  The broader social and constitutive norms associated with 
Article 9 and the legal operation of the provision itself, as 
interpreted by the CLB, exercised considerable power over the 
precise parameters within which the treaty was negotiated.  For, as 
was discussed earlier, the 1960 Security Treaty remained faithful to 
the CLB interpretation of the Article 9(1) prohibition on collective 
self-defense.  The entire structure of the asymmetrical duties, in 
which the United States was obliged to defend Japan, but Japan 
only required to defend U.S. forces from any attack within 
Japanese territory, was in the words of a former senior diplomat 
“the direct result of Japan’s constitutional constraint.”177 
The treaty was not signed until January 1960, and it was 
debated in the Diet in the following months, during which the 
broad-based public opposition to Kishi’s security policies in 
general, and to the renewal of the treaty in particular, reached a 
climax.  Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in the 
streets, often violently, with hundreds of demonstrators and police 
being injured and one student killed.  Six million workers went on 
strike, and the government used the police to physically clear 
Socialist Party members obstructing the deliberations in the Diet.  
 
9(2) so long as they were “defensive [in] character.”  Samuels, supra note 128, at 6.  
This is perhaps the best illustration of just how absurd the attempts to categorize 
weapons systems as being “offensive” or “defensive” are for the purpose of 
determining their constitutionality.  For more on the fallacy of such distinctions, 
see WATANABE YŌZŌ, NICHIBEI ANPOSEIDO TO NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [THE JAPANESE-
AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] 129–30 (1991). 
176 This perception was exacerbated by such incidents as the injury of the 
crew of a Japanese fishing vessel by an American nuclear weapons test on Bikini 
Atoll in 1954, increasing public discussion by Eisenhower and Dulles of the need 
to defend South-East Asia from communism, and the escalating conflict in 
Indochina.  There were even public hints in advance of the French defeat at 
Dienbienphu in mid-1954, that the United States might employ nuclear weapons 
to stave off a communist victory.  LAFEBER, supra note 162, at 309–11. 
177 TOGO, supra note 146, at 60. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
334 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
It reached a crescendo in the spring, and despite Japanese 
government pleas not to do so, President Eisenhower was forced to 
cancel his trip to Tokyo.178  Within days of the treaty coming into 
effect that summer, Kishi resigned. 
The crisis was primarily a backlash against the reactionary 
conservative attempts to undermine Yoshida’s policies and the 
pacifist posture of Japan, and it ended those efforts and further 
solidified the Yoshida Doctrine.  Ikeda Hayato, a protégé of 
Yoshida, succeeded Kishi.  The LDP, recognizing the potential 
conflict and turmoil that would ensue if they continued to pursue 
national security issues, essentially reverted for the next several 
decades to a focus on economic growth and international trade, 
with those factions in favor of the Yoshida Doctrine becoming the 
mainstream of the party. The mainstream remained dominant until 
the end of the century, with the exception of  a short hiatus during 
the Nakasone years in the mid-1980s.179 
The Yoshida doctrine became orthodoxy, and it did keep Japan 
out of Cold War entanglements.  As American involvement 
escalated in Vietnam for instance, and other allies such as South 
Korea felt compelled to contribute troops, Japan was able to remain 
entirely uninvolved.180  Moreover, this doctrine that had become 
entrenched in part because of the pacifist norms of Article 9, 
further shaped and entrenched the identity of pacifism, which in 
turn contributed to the development of policies such as the 
capping of defense spending to 1% of GNP,181 the articulation of 
 
178 See generally LAFEBER, supra note 162, at 319–21 (providing a good account 
of the crisis). 
179 PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 238.  See also BOYD & SAMUELS, supra 
note 104, at 25–26 (describing the process by which supporters of the Yoshida 
Doctrine consolidated political power). 
180 South Korea contributed some 300,000 troops to the U.S. war effort in 
Vietnam.  Pyle, Collective Security, supra note 158, at 104.  Of course, Japan was 
very much involved economically, and the war was a huge boon for Japanese 
economic growth. 
181 This policy was established in 1978 by Prime Minister Miki Takeo in 
response to pressure from the pacifist political forces caused by the government’s 
1976 National Defense Program Outline.  TOGO, supra note 146, at 71–72.  The 1% 
cap has been essentially maintained since.  Prime Minister Nakasone 
ostentatiously announced his abandonment of the policy, but came under 
pressure as a result, and was only able to raise spending to 1.004% of GNP.  His 
own ambitions to develop an “autonomous” defense policy were frustrated by the 
pacifist norms of Article 9.  See KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 117–18, (citing 
Odawara Atsushi, No Tampering with the Brakes on Military Expansion, 32(3) JAPAN 
QUARTERLY 248, 249 (1985)).  See also, PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 273–76 
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the three non-nuclear principles,182 and the ban on weapons 
exports.183 
It was a virtuous circle (or vicious, depending on one’s point of 
view), in which policy re-enforced the constitutive norms flowing 
from Article 9, and the norms in turn shaped policy.  Herein we see 
the internalization of the international law principles in the most 
fundamental way.  The continued growth and development of 
Japan’s military capability ran against the grain of these norms, 
and was the subject of considerable conflict, but it did not belie the 
significance or influence of the norms in Japanese politics and 
policy making.  It was not until the 1990s that the pacifistic norms 
began to be undermined by perceived changes in the international 
environment, and the political constellations that had provided the 
fertile context for them began to change. 
While Article 9 operated as a powerful constitutive norm 
during this entire period, however, its operation as a legal norm 
was less obvious and more ambiguous, a subject to which this 
analysis turns next. 
5.2. Article 9 as Legal Norm 
In considering the operation of a legal norm, particularly one 
enshrined in a constitutional provision, a natural starting point 
would be the manner in which it has been interpreted and 
enforced by the courts.  But in the case of Article 9, it is indeed the 
treatment of the provision by the Supreme Court that makes the 
question of its operation as a legal norm more complicated.  To 
 
(providing an account of Nakasone’s failure to overcome pacifistic norms during 
his tenure as Prime Minister in the mid-80s). 
182 These principles affirmed that Japan would not possess, produce, or 
permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.  The background to this is 
more complicated of course, as the Satō government actually had commissioned a 
study to determine whether Japan ought to develop nuclear weapons, and Satō 
himself made an agreement with Nixon and Kissinger, in November of 1969, to 
permit United States introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa if necessary 
in a crisis.  TOGO, supra note 146, at 63.  Satō, a Yoshida disciple (notwithstanding 
that he was Kishi’s brother), may be seen as having developed the principles for 
cynical reasons, but his actions further embedded the pacifistic norms in any 
event.  Somewhat ironically, Satō received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his 
efforts. 
183 For a comprehensive analysis of the military and defense policy 
developments in this period, see HUGHES, supra note 146, ch. 3; CHRISTOPHER W. 
HUGHES, JAPAN’S SECURITY AGENDA: MILITARY, ECONOMIC & ENVIRONMENTAL 
DIMENSIONS, ch. 4 (2005) [hereinafter HUGHES, SECURITY AGENDA]. 
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begin, it is worth recalling the role of the courts under the 
Constitution.  The GS drafting team had included strong powers of 
judicial review in the Constitution, which survived the ratification 
process intact.  Article 81 of the Constitution provided that the 
Supreme Court was the court of last resort, with the power to 
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or 
other official act.  Article 98 provided that the Constitution was the 
supreme law of the nation, and that any law or other government 
act that was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution were 
invalid and of no force and effect.  Finally, Article 76 provided for 
the authority of the courts, establishing that the judiciary was to be 
independent and bound only by the Constitution. 
Article 9 was one of the very first constitutional issues to reach 
the Supreme Court, when the leader of the Socialist Party brought 
an application to the Supreme Court for a declaration that the 
newly established NPR was unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court 
dismissed the case in 1952, interpreting Article 81 as limiting 
constitutional challenges to concrete cases, conforming to the 
American model of judicial review.184  In doing so the Supreme 
Court narrowed the scope of its jurisdiction.  But the next Article 9 
case to come before the Supreme Court would be the most 
important, the only one in which the Court would offer any 
interpretation of the provision itself, and a judgment in which it 
further limited its own authority quite radically. 
The case, commonly referred to as the Sunakawa case, arose in 
the context of the protests leading up to the renewal of the 1952 
Security Treaty in 1959.  Demonstrators who were prosecuted for 
trespassing on U.S. base property pursuant to a special law 
governing U.S. facilities, argued that the maintenance of U.S. forces 
in Japan, and the 1952 Security Treaty that was the basis for the 
law, were in violation of Article 9(2).  In March of 1959, the Tokyo 
 
184 Case Concerning the National Police Reserve, 6 MINSHŪ 783 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 
8, 1952), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1952.10.8-
1952.-Ma-.No..23.html (trans.).  This case ended debate over whether the Supreme 
Court could exercise a role akin to that of the Constitutional Court in Germany, in 
receiving general constitutional questions, or that of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in hearing references.  See Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview 
of Efforts to Introduce U.S. Theories, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
JAPANESE SOCIETY 253–54 (Yoichi Higuchi, ed., 2001) (detailing the Supreme 
Court’s denial of the possibility of a constitutional court).  Dan Fenno Henderson, 
Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years, in THE CONSTITUTION 
OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947–67, at 120–22 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 
1968). 
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District Court handed down a judgment that held that the treaty 
and the presence of U.S. forces were unconstitutional.185  The 
government made the unprecedented step of appealing directly to 
the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court heard and granted the 
appeal with breathtaking speed, handing down its judgment in 
December of 1959.186 
In addressing the central question of whether the 1952 Security 
Treaty constituted a violation of Article 9(2), the majority decision 
of the Court held that the treaty was “featured with an extremely 
high degree of political consideration . . . having a direct bearing 
upon the very existence of our country [as a sovereign power],” 
and that as such “there is a certain element of incompatibility in 
the process of judicial determination of its constitutionality by a 
court of law which has as its mission the exercise of the purely 
judicial function.”187  It went on to explain that unless the treaty is 
“obviously unconstitutional and void” it was not within the scope 
of the judicial review power of the Court, and had to be left to the 
discretion of the executive and the legislature.  Neither the majority 
nor the seven concurring supplementary opinions188 provided any 
criteria by which a court might assess the difference between laws 
or treaties that were unconstitutional and those that were 
“obviously” unconstitutional.  The powerful and withering 
opinion of Justice Kotani, dissenting on this issue, excoriated the 
majority for what constituted an abdication of judicial 
responsibility over all cases that involved issues of national 
importance.189 
 
185 Sunakawa Case, 89 HANREI TIMUZU 79 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 30, 1959), 
abridged translation in JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN SOCIETY, THE 
ECONOMY, AND POLITICS (Curtis Milhaupt et. al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sunakawa 
DC]. 
186 In an extraordinary archival discovery in early 2008, it was revealed that 
the U.S. Ambassador to Japan met with both the Foreign Minister and the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court to impress upon them the need for haste and, 
presumably, a positive result in the case.  U.S. Coerced Court in ‘59 Base Case, JAPAN 
TIMES, May 1, 2008, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin 
/m20080501a5.htm. 
187 Sunakawa case, 13 KEISHŪ 3225, (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959), available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1959.12.16-1959-A-
No.710.html (trans) [hereinafter Sunakawa SC] (quoting language from section 2, 
paragraph 4 of the majority decision). 
188 Including one by Irei Toshie, then a Supreme Court justice, who had been 
the Director General of the Legislation Bureau during the drafting process. 
189 Sunakawa SC, supra note 187, Opinion of Kotani, J., dissenting,  section 4, 
para. 1. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
338 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:1 
 
All the opinions, including those of the three dissenting 
justices, accepted without any analysis that Japan had an inherent 
right of self-defense, and that nothing in Article 9 foreclosed the 
exercise of that right.  This part of the judgment was not necessary 
to the decision, but it remains the only Supreme Court 
pronunciation on the issue of the right to self-defense.  The Court 
also held that the U.S. forces, not being under the command and 
control of the Japanese government, did not constitute the armed 
forces or other war potential prohibited by Article 9(2).  This left 
open the question of whether or not armed forces similar to the 
U.S. forces then stationed in Japan, would be prohibited if they 
were under the command and control of Japan.  That question 
came before the Supreme Court in the Naganuma Case in 1982, the 
only other significant Article 9 case to reach the Supreme Court. 
In Naganuma, the question of the constitutionality of the SDF 
itself was squarely in issue.  The SDA had successfully requested 
the Forestry Ministry to cancel the designation of a forest so as to 
permit the construction of a missile base.  Residents in the area 
commenced an application claiming that the decision of the 
Ministry canceling the designation was improper, in part because 
the SDF itself was unconstitutional, and thus the decision could not 
be said to have been for the public benefit (one of the necessary 
grounds for such decisions).  They claimed that the construction of 
the site would harm the water table, and make the area a potential 
target for Soviet missiles.  The Sapporo District Court, in very 
careful and rigorous reasons handed down in 1973, rejected the 
Supreme Court’s application in Sunakawa of a “political question 
doctrine” to such issues, and held that the SDF constituted land, 
sea and air forces, in violation of Article 9(2).190 
On appeal, the Sapporo High Court agonized over the proper 
interpretation of Article 9, and applied the doctrine from Sunakawa 
to argue that such issues were in any event not within the scope of 
judicial review. 191  In the end, however, it actually decided the case 
on the basis of standing.  It did so based on the fact that between 
the initial hearing and the appeal, the missile site had been 
 
190 Ito et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 712 HANREI 
JIHŌ 24 (Sapporo D. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI 
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 83 (1996). 
191 Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries v. Ito et al., 27 GYŌSAI 
RESHŪ 1175 (Sapporo High Ct. Sept. 7, 1973), translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 
190, at 120–21 [hereinafter Naganuma HC]. 
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constructed (the injunction had been stayed pending appeal), and 
the SDF had built a number of dikes and other structures to 
minimize the risk of harm to the water table.  The High Court held 
that the narrow legal interest that had been the basis for the 
applicants’ standing to commence the claim in the first place had 
thus been extinguished.  When the case was finally decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1982, the Court entirely avoided the issue of the 
constitutionality of the SDF, also deciding the case on the basis of 
the standing issue, holding that the type of legal interest that 
individuals might have in larger public interests, were not the type 
of interest that could ground a constitutional claim.  Since the 
applicants had lost their basis for a claim, that is the risk to their 
individual proprietary interests, they lacked standing.192  In so 
doing, of course, the Court made Article 9 virtually unenforceable, 
for aside from an SDF member ordered into combat, it would be 
difficult to envision the circumstances in which a violation of 
Article 9 would ground a narrow legal interest of the kind defined 
as providing standing here.193 
The Sunakawa decision has been interpreted by some as the 
Court deferring to the discretion of the executive and legislature 
while nonetheless reserving for itself the authority to intervene in 
the future, in the event that the political branches made a clear or 
obvious violation of Article 9.194  From the perspective of the 
decision being part of the dialogue between different branches of 
government, it is open to such an interpretation, but from a purely 
 
192 Uno et al v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 36 MINSHŪ 
1679 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 1982), translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 190, at 126 (the 
court ignored the separate claim that the facility increased the risk of attack to the 
area in the event of war). 
193 By way of comparison, Canadian courts will exercise their discretion to 
grant standing in constitutional cases where the applicant does not have a direct 
legal interest or exceptional prejudice, in which cases there is standing as of right, 
so long as the applicant can demonstrate that:  1) the issue is a serious one; 2) that 
the applicant has a genuine interest in the issue; and 3) there is no other 
reasonable and effective manner for the issue to come before the court.  PETER 
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 776–80 (5th ed., 2007). 
194 See, e.g., Haley, supra note 81, at 24, 28 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
decision to leave all but clear violations of Article 9 to the discretion of political 
bodies).  Iwaswa Yuji also argues that Sunakawa was significant in that the Court 
established that the substance of a treaty was subject to judicial review for 
constitutionality, which is an issue in the broader debate over the question of 
whether international law, pursuant to Article 98 of the Constitution, is the 
highest law of the land.  YUJI IWASA, INTERNATIONAL LAW HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
JAPANESE LAW: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 100–02 (1998). 
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legal analysis, and in the context of the institution of judicial 
review, it can be characterized as the beginning of the process of 
the courts withdrawing from the field of interpreting and enforcing 
Article 9 as a legal norm.  The decision in Naganuma can be seen as 
having completed the process. 
In this sense it can be argued that Article 9 did not function as a 
strong legal norm, or at least was not given effect in a meaningful 
way, due to the judicial abdication of its authority to interpret and 
enforce the provision.195  And it must be acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court’s position thereby undermined and weakened the 
normative power of Article 9 in its entirety.  But it is also important 
to note that both of these cases related to Article 9(2) and the 
constitutionality of maintaining “war potential” in Japan. The issue 
was not the use of force in Article 9(1), though the Supreme Court 
in Sunakawa did endorse without analysis the CLB view that 
Article 9(1) did not preclude the right to self-defense, and so while 
these decisions undermined the legal norms articulated in Article 9 
generally, their impact can be said to have been much less 
significant on Article 9(1). 
What is more, the emasculation of Article 9 in the courts did 
not mean that the provision ceased to exercise real influence as a 
legal norm, or even that the role of litigation became entirely 
insignificant in the continuing operation of Article 9.  First, the 
abdication by the judiciary of its constitutional responsibilities left 
the field open for the CLB to exercise its institutional power in 
interpreting and enforcing Article 9.  The early role of the CLB in 
establishing the official interpretation was examined earlier in this 
study, and it is indeed important to note that the Supreme Court in 
the Sunakawa judgment essentially conformed to the CLB 
interpretation of Article 9.  And with the Supreme Court effectively 
insulating Article 9 from the scope of judicial review, the authority 
of the CLB as the official interpreter of the provision was greatly 
enhanced.  Moreover, the CLB, which prides itself on its 
consistency, political independence, and ability to ensure that 
legislation conforms to its interpretation of constitutionality, vets 
 
195 Another aspect of the larger project of which this Paper is a part will 
examine the extent to which the design of Article 9 may have contributed to the 
judicial response, and the extent to which Article 9 may have thereby played a 
role in undermining the institution of judicial review in Japan. 
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all defense-related legislation before it becomes law.196  As will be 
seen when this examination turns to the events in the Gulf War, the 
CLB does indeed have the political power to enforce its will in 
ensuring that law and policy conform to the Constitution. 
Second, with respect to the role of the courts, parties continued 
to use litigation to advance claims that government policy violated 
Article 9, notwithstanding the apparent futility of the exercise in 
light of the Supreme Court decisions in Sunakawa and Naganuma.  
It has been observed that this recourse to the courts is not so much 
an attempt to actually obtain the enforcement of Article 9 as a legal 
norm by the courts, but rather is a means of drawing attention to 
the contested nature of the issue and to trigger the powerful norm 
in Japan against overriding minority political views in a 
majoritarian fashion.197  In this sense then, the use of litigation is a 
means of reinforcing and highlighting the constitutive social norms 
inherent in and associated with Article 9 as a means of influencing 
policy. 
This was most recently illustrated by the case in Nagoya, in 
which the plaintiffs sought an injunction against further 
deployment of troops to Iraq, damages, and a declaration that the 
activity of the SDF in Iraq was a violation of Article 9.  On appeal, 
 
196 See, e.g., NAKAMURA, supra note 128, at 3–6, at 11–18, and at 32–34; 
NISHIKAWA, supra note 128, ch. 2 (detailing the CLB’s role in interpreting Article 9, 
and arguing that its interpretations have constrained policy on the issue of 
collective self-defense and troop deployment); Haley, supra note 81, at 19, 28–29 
(arguing that the stance of the judiciary on Article 9 opened the way for the CLB 
to become the principal authority on the question, and that the CLB has imposed a 
“lasting and politically effective constitutional constraint” on Japanese policy).  
See also Samuels, supra note 128, at 4 (similarly arguing that the CLB filled the void 
left by the Courts), and SAMUELS, supra note 160, at 51 (discussing the power of the 
CLB in vetting legislation, and its power vis-à-vis other ministries).  Samuels has 
also argued that the influence of the CLB has declined somewhat since the 1990s, 
and particularly since the era of Koizumi and 9/11.  Id. at 75–76.  But in interviews 
with senior officials in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
both of whom were involved in the legislative process for defense legislation, I 
was advised that this was not the general view within either of those ministries.  
Interview with official at the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya, Tokyo (Japan) (July 
31, 2008); Interview with official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kumigaseki, 
Tokyo (Japan) (Aug. 13, 2008). 
197 See KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 31–32, 118–20; see also HALEY, supra note 
42, at 188 (“Given the improbability of a Japanese Supreme Court decision 
invalidating Japan’s defense policy, the purpose of bringing these actions is 
reasonably assumed to be to keep the issue before the public.”); Chinen, supra 
note 43, at 110 (referencing Haley’s argument that litigation over the merits of 
Article 9 is often a political act). 
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the Nagoya High Court dismissed their claims for lack of standing, 
following the Naganuma precedent, but in obiter opined that the 
operations of the ASDF were so integrated with the activity of 
coalition forces as to constitute a use of force in violation of Article 
9(1).198  The plaintiffs, losers in the case, were jubilant at the 
outcome, while the government could not appeal and was left 
fuming at the “unnecessary” nature of the opinion.  This practice of 
using litigation to achieve objectives indirectly illustrates the 
famous observation of Haley’s, that law in Japan “serves as a 
means for legitimating norms while it remains relatively ineffective 
as an instrument of coercive control.”199 
5.3. The 1991 Gulf War Crisis and its Aftermath 
It is difficult to overstate the profound impact of the Gulf War 
crisis on Japanese foreign policy.  Japan came under intense 
pressure to participate in the war effort, but the government was 
unable to do so. Togo Kazuhiko writes that the events, often 
referred to as “Japan’s defeat in 1991,”200 were such that “[t]he 
crucial issue of security, Japan’s position in the global community 
and her relations with the US were shattered.”201  Even as the 
events were unfolding, there was a sense within the government of 
crisis and looming disaster for Japanese foreign policy, and yet the 
government could not respond militarily in a manner that would 
satisfy international expectations.  This was no existential threat to 
the life of the nation, but it was perceived as a crisis requiring the 
use of force.  To return to the Ulysses metaphor, the Siren song was 
here in full voice and the felt need to respond was huge, but the 
pre-commitment bonds of Article 9 and its associated norms 
operated to utterly constrain the government’s ability to act. 
Japan initially moved quickly in August 1990 to impose 
economic sanctions and freeze Iraqi assets, as authorized by U.N. 
Security Council resolutions.202  Within weeks of the initial 
 
198 Nagoya Decision, supra note 157. 
199 KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 44 (quoting John O. Haley, Consensual 
Governance: A Study of Law, Culture, and the Political Economy of Postwar Japan, in 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS 32, 61 
(Shumpei Kumon & Henry Rosovsky eds., 1992)). 
200 See TESHIMA RYUICHI, 1991 NIHON NO HAIBOKU [Japan’s Defeat in 1991] 
(1993). 
201 TOGO, supra note 146, at 77. 
202 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0661 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
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invasion of Kuwait, Japan announced its contribution of $1 billion 
to the effort that the United States was beginning to coordinate.  
But as the coalition began taking shape and other countries 
deployed military forces to the Gulf, U.S. frustration began to 
mount over the apparent reluctance of Japan to become directly 
involved in the international effort.  Not only did Japan receive 
two-thirds of its energy from the region, but it was perceived in the 
United States as now refusing to assist its treaty partner after 
decades of American military protection, and the United States 
was no longer restrained by Cold War imperatives in its criticism 
of Japan.203  Outrage was expressed in the U.S. Congress through 
the passage of a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
based in Japan.  Japan announced a further $3 billion contribution 
in mid-September, but only after leaks in the press about internal 
tensions, which exacerbated the perception that the government 
was simply responding under pressure and contributing as little as 
it could get away with.204 
The reality was that many in the Japanese government felt 
keenly the need for Japan to contribute more and in a more direct 
manner.  Ozawa Ichiro, then an influential member of the younger 
generation of LDP politicians, led a delegation to Prime Minister 
Kaifu’s residence to press the argument for a Japanese contribution 
of troops to the coalition forces.205  Ozawa was of the view that a 
U.N.-authorized collective security operation was not inconsistent 
with the Constitution.206  Kaifu himself was also initially inclined to 
take action to provide more direct contributions to the coalition 
efforts, but his position changed after consulting with the CLB 
Director General, Kudō Atsuo.  The CLB position was that it was 
constitutionally impermissible for Japan to deploy the SDF in 
 
203 PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 290–91. 
204 TOGO, supra note 146, at 305. 
205 Samuels, supra note 128, at 7. 
206 Ozawa put his thoughts on the issue into his book: OZAWA ICHIRO, NIHON 
KAIZŌ KEIKAKU [A PLAN FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF JAPAN] (1993).  Part Two of 
the book outlines his views on what Japan had to do to become a “normal” 
country.  Ozawa continues to hold the view today, in his position as leader of the 
JDP, that collective security is consistent with the Constitution.  He points to the 
clause in the preamble of the Constitution: “We desire to occupy an honored place 
in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the 
banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from 
the earth.  We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in 
peace, free from fear and want.  We believe that no nation is responsible to itself 
alone . . . .”  Id. 
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support of the likely war in the Gulf, since it would constitute a use 
of force in settlement of an international dispute, and as part of 
either an exercise of collective self-defense or collective security, or 
both (the U.N. Security Council had not yet passed resolution 678, 
authorizing the use of force).207  The government tried to develop 
programs for civilian participation in support of coalition forces, 
but these were met with opposition within the public at home, and 
abroad it simply added to the growing perception of Japan as 
shirking its international treaty responsibilities. 
The government then submitted the U.N. Peace Cooperation 
Bill to the Diet in October 1990, which contemplated the 
establishment of a “U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps” for dispatch to 
the Gulf in order to provide non-combat related logistical support 
for coalition forces.  This “peace cooperation corps” was to be 
distinct from the SDF, but it would be primarily comprised of SDF 
“volunteers.”  The bill was wrecked on the reefs of Article 9 
objections.  The government itself had in 1980 submitted a written 
statement to the Diet stipulating that the participation of the SDF in 
U.N. operations was unconstitutional and impermissible if the 
purpose of the U.N. forces was to use force.  Since it was clear that 
the coalition forces gathering in the Gulf were there for the 
purpose of employing force in the event Iraq refused to withdraw 
from Kuwait, it followed that SDF troops, volunteers in a “peace 
corps” or otherwise, could not participate.  There were tortured 
debates in which the government argued that the SDF would be 
“collaborating” but not “participating,” and the government 
consistently maintained in the debate that its interpretation of the 
constitution had not changed, and that this would not be an 
exercise of collective self-defense.  By November, however, the 
government could not even get more than half of the LDP itself on 
board, and it had to withdraw the bill.208 
It was not merely the CLB intransigence that stymied the 
government.  Important members of the government took the 
 
207 See DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 274 (arguing that such action was an exercise 
of collective self-defense and not a collective security operation, notwithstanding 
the resolution). 
208 TOGO, supra note 146, at 386–87.  See also KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 126 
(describing how “[t]he bill died . . . without coming to a vote in the Diet”); AKIKO 
FUKUSHIMA, JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE EMERGING LOGIC OF MULTILATERALISM 
69 (1999) (“After a lengthy debate due to strong opposition in the Diet to the 
proposed bill, the Government and the Liberal Democratic Party, then the 
majority party, decided to withdraw the bill . . . .”). 
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position that Japan could not simply violate the constitutional 
principles because of the perceived need to meet international 
expectations.  Miyazawa Kiichi, who would succeed Kaifu as 
Prime Minister, said at the time “[w]e must clearly state that we 
cannot change the Japanese Constitution at this time.  Even if other 
countries say that having such a constitution is outrageous, we 
must maintain the position we decided on this and it’s not for 
others to interfere.”209  Moreover, not only were all the opposition 
parties lined up against the bill, but the majority of the public was 
also squarely opposed to it.210  And the opposition to the bill was 
fundamentally because of the widespread view that any 
contribution of troops to the looming conflict would constitute a 
violation of Article 9.  The constitutionality of collective self-
defense and the contribution of troops to U.N. operations was the 
fundamental issue in the crisis, and the constraints imposed by the 
Constitution ultimately prevented the government from being able 
to develop and implement policies to meet U.S. and international 
expectations.211  The power of both the narrow legal rule and the 
broader constitutional and social norms of Article 9 were at work. 
Notwithstanding the opinions of politicians such as Miyazawa 
regarding the necessity of respecting the constitutional constraints, 
the Gulf War crisis was indeed widely seen as a humiliating 
catastrophe for Japan.  The government ended up having 
contributed over $13 billion, but the perception within the country 
was that Japan was being viewed with derision by the rest of the 
world for its so-called checkbook diplomacy.  Much was made of 
the fact that when Kuwait took out a full page ad in the New York 
Times and the Washington Post to thank all the countries that had 
contributed to its liberation, Japan was conspicuously absent from 
the list.212  The sense of humiliation bit deep, and led to a sea 
change in both government and public views about Japan’s role in 
 
209 PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 291. 
210 KATZENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 126 (noting that public support for the bill 
was between “20 to 30 percent”). 
211 PYLE, JAPAN RISING, supra note 158, at 290; TOGO, supra note 146, at 305–06, 
386–87.  Academics, at the time and thereafter also raised other arguments against 
participation, including the need to maintain the support of the Arab world.  See, 
e.g., WATANABE YŌZŌ, supra note 174, at 245–46. 
212 TOGO, supra note 146, at 307. 
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the world and the necessity to contribute more to international 
peace and security.213 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the shift in attitudes following 
the crisis, Article 9 and its associated norms continued to exercise 
constraints on the government’s ability to move policy in the 
direction of making greater military contributions to international 
security efforts.  The first step was in September 1991, while the 
wounds were still fresh, when the Law for Cooperation in Relation 
to United Nations Peacekeeping Activities,214 commonly known as 
the PKO Bill (and when passed, the PKO Law), was submitted to 
the Diet.  In contrast to the earlier bill, it limited the contemplated 
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. 
U.N. peacekeeping operations had evolved in the 1950’s as a 
U.N. sanctioned mechanism to create and maintain conditions of 
peace and stability in areas of regional conflict, when Cold War 
deadlocks in the Security Council precluded the authorization of 
collective security operations under Article 42 of the Charter.215  
The traditional U.N. peacekeeping formula as it operated during 
the Cold War was predicated upon there being a ceasefire in place, 
and there being mutual consent to the presence of U.N. 
peacekeeping forces to monitor and help maintain the ceasefire.  
Such operations did not involve the use of force in the sense 
contemplated by Article 42 of the Charter.216  Generally, the 
 
213 See FUKUSHIMA, supra note 208, at 69–70 (describing the consensus that 
emerged regarding the role SDF forces should play in future U.N. missions in the 
wake of the 1991 Gulf War); see also TOGO, supra note 146, at 387, 427 (noting that 
“[t]here was awareness in Japan that something had to be done to remedy the 
situation” and that the SDF began “actively participating in UN peacekeeping 
operations” following the 1991 Gulf War); HUGHES, JAPAN’S RE-EMERGENCE, supra 
note 146, at 75 (discussing the passage of bills in the Diet which aimed at 
enhancing security cooperation between the United States and Japan through the 
grant of additional powers to the prime minister to command the SDF). 
214 Kokusai rengo heiwa iji katsudo nado ni taisuru kyoryoku ni kansuru hōritsu 
[Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations], Law No. 79 of 1992, as amended [hereinafter the PKO Law]. 
215 For a good overview of this development, see MAX HILAIRE, UNITED 
NATIONS LAW AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL (2005).  Then Canadian Minister for 
External Affairs, Lester Pearson, received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957 for his 
part in developing the peacekeeping formula during the 1956 Suez Crisis. 
216 Indeed, there is no clear provision in the Charter for the peacekeeping 
formula as it developed in the Cold War years, but it came to be accepted practice, 
and it clearly was not seen as collective security pursuant to Article 42.  See GRAY, 
supra note 137, at 200–04 (describing the Cold War dynamic between the U.N. 
General Assembly and Security Council and the emergence of peacekeeping 
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principle governing U.N. peacekeeping operations was that force 
was only to be used by participating peacekeepers in self-
defense.217 
Japan had in fact contributed observers to such operations in 
the past, though typically election monitors and the like, and never 
members of the SDF.218  But notwithstanding the fact that 
peacekeeping operations did not constitute either collective self-
defense or collective security operations, and were not authorized 
to use force other than in self-defense, and notwithstanding the 
shift in public opinion regarding direct contribution to some forms 
of international peace efforts (from 80% opposed to any 
deployment of the SDF in the Gulf War, to almost 60% in favor of 
some kind of PKO participation in 1991),219 the new PKO Bill was 
extremely narrowly framed, and it still met with heavy weather in 
the Diet. 
The bill stipulated explicitly that the activities of SDF members 
participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations pursuant to the law 
were not to be construed as constituting the use of force.  It also 
included five conditions to Japanese participation, the last two of 
which were unique and raised the bar for participation 
significantly, namely, that if any of the three previous conditions 
(ceasefire, consent, and impartiality) ceased to obtain, Japanese 
forces were to be withdrawn; and that the use of weapons by SDF 
personnel was to be strictly limited to that required for personal 
protection.  The fifth condition meant that Japanese troops could 
not respond with force to defend other peacekeepers who might 
 
efforts); HILAIRE, supra note 215, at 25 (discussing U.N. peacekeeping during the 
early years of the Cold War). 
217 GRAY, supra note 137, at 203. The subject of peacekeeping itself is complex, 
and it has evolved in the post-Cold War world to include peace enforcement and 
other hybrids that complicate these principles.  Even as early as 1960, the ONUC 
forces were authorized to use force to prevent civil war.  But generally, PKO 
forces were limited by rules of engagement that restricted the use of force to self-
defense. 
218 In 1988 Japan had contributed a Foreign Ministry official as political 
councilor to UNGOMAP in Afghanistan, and another had been sent as an 
observer to UNIIMOG on the Iran-Iraq border in 1988-89.  TOGO, supra note 146, at 
385.  Election monitors were sent to Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti, in 1989-90.  
Caroline Rose, Japanese Role in PKO and Humanitarian Assistance, in JAPANESE 
FOREIGN POLICY TODAY: A READER 122, 124 (Inoguchi Takashi & Purnendra Jain 
eds., 2000).  See also HIROSE YOSHIO, KOKUREN NO HEIWAIJI KATSUDO—KOKUSAIHŌ TO 
KENPŌ NO SHIZA KARA [U.N. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITY: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION] (1992). 
219 Rose, supra note 218, at 127. 
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come under attack.220  Moreover, the fourth condition 
contemplated Japan pulling out of operations as soon as one side 
or the other withdrew its consent to Japanese forces being there, or 
the ceasefire agreement was breached.  These strict restrictions, 
with their rather unpalatable ramifications, were directly 
attributable to the perceived limitations of Article 9, and were 
dictated by the CLB in accordance with its interpretation of Article 
9.221 
Yet even those restrictions were not sufficient to satisfy the 
opposition, and the government had to agree to the provisions in 
the bill authorizing “core activities” of peacekeeping (cease-fire 
monitoring, patrolling, checkpoint operation, etc.) being “frozen” 
sine die, with only the humanitarian and logistical support activity 
being immediately authorized.222  New legislation would be 
required to implement the “frozen” or suspended core activities, 
and thereafter, new legislation would be required for each and 
every deployment of SDF personnel for peacekeeping operations 
that would entail such core activity.  Even so, the public and 
opposition party resistance was significant, but the bill passed in 
June of 1992 and came into effect in August. 223 
Japan was able to deploy peacekeepers shortly thereafter, with 
the establishment of UNTAC in Cambodia in March 1992.  The 
mission was limited to SDF engineers and civilian police, and it 
came under international criticism for Japanese efforts to remain 
out of harm’s way, but it was the first significant and public 
deployment of SDF abroad since the war. 224 The mission was 
 
220 The use of arms was provided for specifically in Article XXIV of the law, 
which limited the use of small arms under Section 1 to situations “if it is deemed 
that the unavoidable needs exist on reasonable grounds so as to protect their own 
lives or persons or those of other Corps Personnel present with them on the same 
spot,” and provided in Section 4 that such use would not cause harm to other 
persons “except for cases corresponding to the provisions of Articles 36 and 37 of 
the Penal Code (Law No. 45 of 1907).”  Shunji Yanai, Law Concerning Cooperation 
for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations, in 36 JAPANESE 
ANNUAL OF INT’L L. 33, 39 n.11 (Soji Yamamoto et al. eds., 1993). 
221 TOGO, supra note 146, at 388; see also Yanai, supra note 220, NAKAMURA, 
supra note 128, at ch. 4. 
222 TOGO, supra note 146, at 388; Rose, supra note 218, at 128.  The different 
operations are set out under the definition of “international peace cooperation 
assignments” in Article III(3) of the PKO Law.  See also FUKUSHIMA, supra note 208, 
at 71–73. 
223 TOGO, supra note 146, at 389. 
224 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Actions of Japan Peacekeepers in Cambodia Raise 
Questions and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 8. I say public, because 
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portrayed as a success, and Japan continued to contribute 
peacekeepers to U.N. missions throughout the 1990s, but always 
under the limitations of the five conditions, and never engaging in 
the “core activities” of military peacekeepers.  Even as Japan 
nurtured growing ambitions to obtain a permanent seat on the 
U.N. Security Council, therefore, Article 9(1) constrained its 
operations in support of the U.N., and undercut its aspirations.225 
5.4. The Post-9/11 World 
Along with the shifting attitudes about the need for Japan to 
contribute to international peace and security, there were also 
developments in the 1990’s that significantly affected the sense of 
insecurity and vulnerability in Japan.  The rise of a North Korean 
nuclear threat in 1993 was soon followed by the Taiwanese straits 
crisis during 1995-1996, then the North Korean missile tests in 
1998, and the increasing incidences of North Korean “spy ships” 
entering Japanese waters.  These were coupled with the perceived 
inadequacies in the government’s response to the Kobe earthquake 
and the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack, adding to a general sense of 
insecurity.  The later disclosure that North Korea had abducted 
some thirteen Japanese nationals in the 1980’s further increased the 
public sense of vulnerability and created a heightened interest in 
national security.  The government issued a new NDPO in 1995 
and the 1997 Guidelines discussed earlier.  Both of these expanded 
the scope of SDF operations while repeatedly pronouncing 
adherence to the Article 9 limitations.226 
It was within this context that, in April 2001, Koizumi Junichiro 
became prime minister.  He had come into the LDP under the wing 
of Fukuda Takeo (father of Fukuda Yasuo, who was prime minister 
during 2007-2008) and was very much a part of the anti-
mainstream revisionist wing of the party.  He would go on to 
become one of the most popular and politically powerful prime 
 
Japanese minesweepers were secretly deployed during the Korean war. LAFEBER, 
supra note 162, at 285–86. 
225 TOGO, supra note 146, at 379–80. 
226 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Defense Program Outline in 
and after FY 1996, translated at http://www.fas.org/news/japan/ndpo.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter the 1996 NDPO] (outlining the guidelines for 
Japan’s defense capabilities).  See 1997 Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1623; see also 
HUGHES, JAPAN’S RE-EMERGENCE, supra note 146, at 69 (discussing both the 1997 
Guidelines and 1996 NDPO). 
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ministers in the post-war era.  He used his power within the party 
to sideline the pragmatists of the Yoshida school and to 
significantly advance policy on security and constitutional issues 
during his five years at the helm.227 
The September 11th terrorist attack on New York City and 
Washington D.C. occurred just five months into his term.  It was an 
opportunity to make amends for the failures in 1991 and to 
advance many of the issues on the revisionist agenda, and Koizumi 
seized the moment with great speed and determination.  Within a 
week of the attack Koizumi announced a policy of unqualified 
support for the United States and the international effort against 
terrorism. Less than two weeks after that, he enacted the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML),228 which authorized the 
government to contribute to the efforts of the international 
community in the “prevention and eradication” of international 
terrorism.  Specifically, the ATSML authorized the government to 
use the SDF in the provision of “Cooperation and Support 
Activities, Search and Rescue Activities, Assistance to Affected 
People, and other necessary measures.”229  This provision consisted 
primarily of providing materials and services (such as medical 
services, transportation, and other logistical services) to the forces 
of other countries. 
The ATSML was passed into law in record time for a bill of this 
nature, taking only ten days in a process that was characterized by 
little controversy.  As Togo writes, “[w]hat the Kaifu government 
wanted to achieve in assisting the UN multinational forces during 
 
227 BOYD & SAMUELS, supra note 104, at 36; TOMOHITO SHINODA, KOIZUMI 
DIPLOMACY: JAPAN’S KANTEI APPROACH TO FOREIGN AND DEFENSE AFFAIRS (2007). 
228 Heisei 13 nen 9 gatsu 11 nichi no amerikagasshūkoku ni oite hasseishita 
terorisuto niyoru kōgekitou ni taiōshite okonowareru kokusairengōkensho no 
mokuteki tassei no tame no shogaikoku no katsudō ni taishite waga kuni ga jisshi 
suru sochi oyobi kanren suru kokusairengō ketsugi tou ni motozuku jindōteki 
sochi ni kan suru tokubetsu sochihō [The Special Measures Law Concerning 
Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries 
Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response 
to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United 
States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on 
Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations], Law No. 113 of 2001 (Japan), available 
at http://www.ron.gr.jp/law/law/h13terro.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008), 
unofficial English translation avaliable at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy 
/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
[hereinafter ATSML].  For further discussion of the law, see TAMURA, supra note 
121, at 483; HATAKE, supra note 105, at 258. 
229 ATSML, supra note 228, art. 3(1). 
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the Gulf War was basically accepted in relation to the common 
fight against international terrorism.”230  Yet, even ten years after 
the 1991 defeat, in the midst of shifting attitudes on security and in 
the face of the terrorist attack that was widely perceived as world-
altering, the ATSML reflects the constraints of, and is responsive 
to, the provisions of Article 9.  Thus, it was specified that “these 
measures must not constitute the threat or use of force,” and 
measures were limited to “areas where combat is not taking place 
or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being 
implemented.”231  Where such areas involved the territory of a 
foreign state (as opposed to international waters), consent of the 
state in question had to be obtained.232  As with the PKO Law, it 
provided that if the implementation areas no longer met these 
criteria, the Minister of State for Defense was required to either 
alter the area designation or order the cessation of Japanese 
activities in the area.  In the event that combat developed in the 
area, the on-scene commander was required to suspend activities 
or evacuate the area pending such orders.233  The use of weapons 
was subject to the same restrictions as under the PKO Law, 
including the restriction that any bodily harm caused by the use of 
firearms was limited to situations that would meet the Japanese 
domestic criminal law requirements of self-defense and 
necessity.234 
The Japanese government acted quickly on the basis of the new 
law and dispatched five ships and approximately eight aircraft to 
participate in support operations in the Northern Indian Ocean 
related to the invasion of Afghanistan.235  At the same time, 
legislation was passed to finally “unfreeze” the core activities 
provided for in the PKO Law.236  Shortly thereafter the government 
passed a series of new laws for which conservatives had long been 
calling, which set out the mechanisms, procedures, and legal 
authority pursuant to which the SDF could respond in the event of 
 
230 TOGO, supra note 146, at 393. 
231 ATSML, supra note 228, arts. 3(2),  3(3)(ii). 
232 Id. art. 3(3)(ii). 
233 Id. arts. 7(3), 7(4). 
234 Id. art. 10 (citing articles 36 and 37 of the penal code). 
235 Though the dispatch of an Aegis destroyer as part of the contingent was 
delayed due to debate over the constitutionality of its participation in electronic 
warfare and intelligence gathering operations. 
236 TOGO, supra note 146, at 394–95. 
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an emergency.  These created the legal basis for a range of military 
activity that had been missing due to the taboos associated with 
Article 9.  But even with their implementation in the aftermath of 
an international crisis, their detail reflected the continued influence 
of Article 9(1).237 
With the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Koizumi again came to 
the support of the Bush administration, and again the restrictions 
of Article 9 made themselves felt.  While Koizumi fully supported 
the U.S. position politically and made financial contributions to the 
humanitarian aspects of the occupation as soon as the war began, 
the norms against use of force still operating in Japan precluded 
Koizumi from offering any direct support until the initial military 
operation was complete and the “occupation” of Iraq was 
established by U.N. resolution.238  Even then, the bill the 
government submitted to the Diet to authorize the deployment of 
SDF troops to Iraq limited the purpose of the mission to strictly 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and contained the 
same limitations and restrictions as the ATSML.239  The bill was 
passed into law in July 2003, but it was controversial. Even 
politicians such as Ozawa Ichiro, the champion of international 
cooperation, argued that the deployment of SDF troops to Iraq, 
although limited to humanitarian efforts, would be a violation of 
Article 9.240  Once again, lawsuits were brought to challenge the 
deployment, and remind the nation that the norms of Article 9 
were not dead, notwithstanding that the cases would likely be 
dismissed by the district courts.241  When the four hundred SDF 
 
237 HUGHES, JAPAN’S RE-EMERGENCE, supra note 146, at 73–76; BOYD & SAMUELS, 
supra note 104, at 43–44.  For a discussion of the three new laws for contingencies 
in the event of armed attack, see Isozaki Yōsuke, Buryoku kōgeki jitai taishohō tou 
yūji 3 pō [3 Emergency Laws for Response to Circumstances of Armed Attack and 
Other Matters], 1252 JURISTO 54 (2003) (Japan).  For discussion of the seven 
additional laws passed in 2004, see Ōishi Toshio, Kokuminhogohō tou yūji kanren 7 
hō [7 Emergency Laws for the Protection of Nationals and Other Matters], 1274 
JURISTO 41 (2004) (Japan).  For a further discussion and analysis of both sets of 
laws, see TAMURA, supra note 121, at ch. 9 and HATAKE, supra note 105, at ch. 3.  
The laws in part created legal authority for various SDF actions in the event of 
armed attack, but also provided for domestic implementation of aspects of 
LOIAC, such as the handling of prisoners of war. 
238 TOGO, supra note 146, at 309. 
239 Iraq SML, supra note 127. 
240 Samuels, supra note 128, at 11. 
241  See, e.g., Injunction on the Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Iraq and 
Other Matters Case, Sapporo D. Ct., Nov. 19, 2007, (TKC Lex/DB No. 28140188), 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20071220100819.pdf (dismissing 
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troops arrived in Iraq, the Japanese government informed other 
coalition members that Japanese troops could not use force to 
defend anyone other than themselves.242 
Koizumi brought the army contingent home from Iraq as the 
insurgent conflict deepened in 2006, though the air force 
contingent remained to continue to provide airlift support.  The 
support for “anti-terrorist” activities in Afghanistan under the 
ATSML continued until late 2007, resulting in several extensions of 
the law.  When it came up for renewal in November 2007, 
however, there was increasing debate over the legitimacy of 
Japan’s operations in the Indian Ocean and the extent to which its 
support might actually be aiding U.S. efforts in Iraq.  Ozawa Ichiro, 
then the leader of the DPJ, opposed renewal of the ATSML on the 
grounds that operations in Afghanistan constituted collective self-
defense rather than U.N.-authorized operations, and therefore 
violated Article 9.  The debate again demonstrated the salience and 
normative power of Article 9.243  In the end, the issue led to Prime 
Minister Abe’s sudden and ignoble resignation and the 
government was unable to pass the bill renewing the law.  A 
replacement law was enacted in early 2008, with much more 
stringent restrictions on the MSDF’s operations and the kind of 
support it could provide.244 
The exact lines delineating between collective self-defense and 
collective security operations continued to blur in domestic 
discourse, a process quite deliberately encouraged by the 
government with its use of vague terms such as “international 
 
a claim that the Iraq SML was a violation of Art. 9); and Injunction on the 
Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Iraq and Other Matters Case, Kyoto D. Ct., 
Mar. 23, 2007, (TKC Lex/DB No. 28130979), available at http://www.courts 
.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070405161112.pdf (similarly dismissing a claim that the Iraq 
SML was a violation of Art. 9). 
242 Samuels, supra note 128, at 7. 
243 The debate reflected a rather confused understanding of the legal issues 
involved.  For the Author’s view on the debate, see Craig Martin, Japan’s 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law and Confusion Over U.N. Authority, JAPAN TIMES  
(Japan), Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin 
/eo20071008a2.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
244 Terotaisaku kaijō soshikatsudō ni taisuru hokyūshien katsudō no jisshi ni kan 
suru tokubetsu sochihō [Special Measures Law for the Execution of Replenishment 
Support Activity for Counter Terror Maritime Interdiction Operations], Law No. 1 
of 2008 (Japan).  For an early analysis of the law, see Okamoto Shinichiro, 
Terotaisaku kaijō soshikatsudō ni taisuru hokyūshien katsudō no jisshi ni kan suru 
tokubetsu sochihō, 1353 JURISTO 48 (2008) (Japan). 
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cooperation.”245  Nonetheless, the prohibitions on the use of armed 
force abroad, on the deployment of SDF as combatants in an 
international armed conflict, and on the participation in collective 
self-defense and collective security (even as the scope of these 
concepts may be shrinking), continued to exercise real constraints 
on government policy.  This was again reinforced in April 2008, 
when the Nagoya High Court stunned the government with its 
opinion that the operations of the ASDF in Iraq constituted a use of 
force in violation of both the Iraq SML and Article 9(1).246  The 
government was dismissive of the Court’s decision, but the 
judgment brought the issue back to the forefront of national debate 
and reminded the government that there are limits to its range of 
permissible conduct.  While public opinion on the issues related to 
Japan’s identity as a pacifist state has evolved considerably over 
the last two decades, the bedrock principles of opposition to the 
use of force and any involvement in collective security activities, 
continue to receive broad public support.247 
In closing, a few words should be said about Article 9(2).  This 
account has not examined the steady growth of the SDF and the 
military capability of Japan.  In that regard Article 9 has clearly not 
operated as effectively to constrain policy, though even there it 
cannot be said to have been entirely without influence.  Given the 
CLB’s consistent interpretation that Japan is permitted the 
minimum necessary military capability required to exercise the 
 
245 This term, which has no meaning in international law and could 
conceivably cover everything from collective self-defense to participation with a 
coalition in an aggressive war, is even used by the LDP in its proposed 
amendments to Article 9, made public in August 2005.  The government, under 
Prime Minister Abe in 2007, raised the issue of “re-interpreting” Article 9, and it 
established an expert committee to study the issue of such “re-interpretation.”  See 
ANZEN HOSHŌ NO HŌTEKI KIBAN NO SAIKŌCHIKU NI KAN SURU KONDANKAI” 
HŌKOKUSHO, [REPORT OF “THE PANEL ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY LEGAL FOUNDATION”] (June 24, 2008), available at http://www.kantei.go 
.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/houkokusho.pdf. Such “re-interpretation” is, in my 
view, entirely illegitimate, and the result-oriented approach taken by the panel 
further illustrated the illegitimacy of the process, but the perceived need to 
engage in such efforts is further evidence of the constraining power that the 
provision continues to exercise. 
246 Nagoya Decision, supra note 157.  For an early analysis of the case itself, 
see Kobayashi Takeshi, Jieitai iraku hahei iken Nagoya kōsai hanketsu no igi 
[Unconstitutionality of the Iraq Deployment: The Significance of the Nagoya High 
Court Judgment] 80 HŌJI JIHŌ 8, 1 (July 2008) (Japan). 
247 GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN’S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION: 
DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 32 (2001). 
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right of self-defense, the apparent constraint on military build-up 
in Article 9(2) was always the least effective component of the 
provision.  Yet the unique prohibition on the maintenance of 
armed forces also helped shape the constitutive norms of Japan as 
a pacifist country, and formed the basis of much of the opposition 
to the SDF.  At the same time, however, it was also the source of 
the most problems in dealing with Article 9 as a legal norm.  The 
growing gulf between the reality of Japan’s sophisticated and very 
capable military and the clear prohibitions in Article 9(2) has made 
this issue the lightning rod for constitutional debate and conflict.  
As such it has also obscured the much more significant and 
effective normative power of Article 9(1), and the extent to which 
the international law principles on the prohibition of the use of 
force in Article 9(1) have operated to effectively constrain 
government policy. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Japanese experience with Article 9 of its constitution has 
been rich and complicated.  This Paper has only been able to touch 
on some of the features most relevant to the central inquiry, and 
much has had to be left unexplored.  On the other hand, it has 
dwelt on some of the historical detail for the purpose of providing 
a “thick” account of the constitutional experience, as evidence in 
support of the conclusions being advanced.  The breadth and 
complexity of the Article 9 narrative is indeed reflective of just how 
integral the issues surrounding this provision are to Japan’s 
politics, law, and broader history since the war.  Nonetheless, it is 
suggested that the Japanese experience with Article 9 is not only 
important in terms of Japan’s own legal and political development, 
but also because it provides important lessons that are relevant to 
more general issues in constitutional law and the relationship 
between constitutional and international law.  Indeed it is 
important to be clear that the analysis in this Paper has taken no 
position on whether the operation of Article 9 has, on balance, been 
beneficial or injurious to Japan’s national policy, or whether Article 
9 ought to be amended and if so, how.  It is not intended to be part 
of that debate, though its analysis of the international law 
perspective might be of some assistance in that national discourse. 
The particular lesson of the Article 9 experience that this Paper 
has sought to establish is that it is feasible to incorporate 
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international law principles on the use of armed force into national 
constitutions so as to effectively influence and constrain national 
policy regarding involvement in armed conflict.  The evidence 
reviewed here suggests that the American drafters responsible for 
the initial design of Article 9 drew upon international law 
principles, specifically from the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Article 
2(4) of the U.N. Charter, in drafting Article 9(1).  That they had 
done so was clearly understood by the Japanese government and 
the legislators who deliberated on the draft during the ratification 
process.  The provision was recognized in the process as being a 
device designed, at least in part, to prevent future governments 
from engaging in armed conflict and so may be characterized as a 
true self-binding pre-commitment device. 
Moreover, the pacifist ideals underlying Article 9 were 
embraced during the ratification debates, and they became the 
locus of powerful social and constitutive norms such that the non-
use of force and renunciation of military involvement became 
closely bound up with the national identity.  These norms were 
contested, it is true, and they continue to be the subject of debate, 
but they were internalized into the social and political fabric to 
such an extent that they significantly impacted national policy.  
Thus, Article 9 operated at several levels:  as a legal norm, which 
was primarily articulated and enforced by the CLB and 
occasionally by the lower courts, and as a social and political norm, 
which manifested itself in political conflict and party platforms, 
public opinion, academia, and the media.  In this sense, this history 
of the internalization and implementation of its principles on a 
number of domestic planes is consistent with and supportive of the 
transnational legal process theories of international law 
compliance. 
It has been suggested here that the combined operation of these 
norms effectively shaped national policy, and in times of crisis 
effectively bound the government and prevented it from 
contributing more directly to international military operations.  
This function of Article 9 is not always obvious, given the periods 
when the government cynically used it as a convenient shield to 
ward off international and domestic pressure to become more 
involved and expend resources on international problems.  But the 
binding power of Article 9 was certainly evident in the Gulf War of 
1991, when the government sought desperately to contribute more 
to the coalition efforts but was stymied by CLB insistence that 
Article 9 prohibited such involvement, and the public itself used 
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Article 9 as in the locus of its opposition to the war.  The influence 
of Article 9 can be seen even now in the post-9/11 era.  Moreover, 
the fact remains that Japan has not used force, been directly 
involved in any armed conflict, or deployed armed forces as 
combatants in a theatre of armed conflict since the promulgation of 
its constitution. 
Of course the story is not a simple one and the “lesson” to be 
distilled from the experience is not without its complications.  
Article 9 did not simply incorporate principles of jus ad bellum in a 
straightforward manner.  Article 9(2) grafted on to jus ad bellum 
principles a unique prohibition on the maintenance of all armed 
forces and a principle from jus in bello apparently intended to 
achieve jus ad bellum objectives.  This jury-rigged provision thus 
contained internal conflicts that created inconsistencies with 
Japan’s treaty obligations and its perceived international 
responsibilities.  These, in turn, are the primary reasons that Article 
9 has been the lightning rod for such visceral political conflict, and 
arguably why the judiciary has been so reluctant to enforce Article 
9 as a legal norm. 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding these complications, Japan’s 
experience with Article 9 still demonstrates that it is possible to 
incorporate principles of jus ad bellum into a national constitution 
and that those principles so incorporated can operate to effectively 
shape national policy on the use of armed force.  Indeed, the 
Japanese experience, in which the principles of jus ad bellum were 
embraced and internalized as powerful norms at the political, 
social, and legal level and successfully operated at all three levels 
to shape policy in a manner consistent with international law, is 
powerful support for the international legal process theories on 
compliance with international law.  Moreover, the incorporation of 
these principles in such a manner created a clear pre-commitment 
device.  Evidence that the pre-commitment device thus designed 
operated to effectively constrain government policy in moments of 
perceived crisis supports not only the general theories of pre-
commitment, but also the arguments being advanced here—  
namely, that it is possible to use constitutional pre-commitments to 
lock in and implement international law norms for the purpose of 
strengthening future compliance with the international law regime 
on the use of armed force. 
Clausewitz wrote that the constraints that international law 
placed on the use of force were imperceptible and hardly worth 
mentioning, and at the time, bare century ago, that was all too true.  
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Much has changed since then, however, and international law has 
developed to significantly limit the institution of war.  As in other 
areas of international law, domestic implementation would likely 
further increase the effectiveness of the legal constraints on the use 
of armed force, and the pre-commitment mechanisms of 
constitutions could serve that purpose well.  The details of that 
argument are left for another day, but Japan’s experience with 
Article 9(1) provides evidence that constitutional provisions can 
serve to bind the dogs of war. 
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